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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that The Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law," and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(c), which provides that the Court has appellate jurisdiction over
"discipline of lawyers."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the decision of the Ethics and Discipline Committee to impose

a public reprimand correct?
2.

Did the Ethics and Discipline Committee reasonably protect Mr.

Nemelka's due process rights?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of attorney discipline cases is that the Court
reviews the findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard reserving the
right to draw different inferences from the facts and make an independent
determination as to the correctness of the discipline actually imposed.1
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Rule 14-510, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and Rules 14-603607 Standards of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
verbatim in Appellee's Addendum.

1

Appellee's Addendum (000001-000006).

1

The rules are set forth

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Ethics and Discipline Committee for the Supreme Court ("Ethics and Discipline
Committee") to sanction Richard Nemelka by imposing a public reprimand for
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Course of Proceedings: On June 14, 2007, a Screening Panel of the
Ethics and Discipline Committee ("Screening Panel") heard evidence regarding a
Complaint against Mr. Nemelka filed by Tina Simmons Pugh. The Screening
Panel found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Nemelka had violated
several of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that he receive
a public reprimand.

The Screening Panel Chair issued Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand on
June 29, 2007.2
Mr. Nemelka filed an Exception to the Findings on July 19, 2007. On April
24, 2008, the Exception Hearing was held. Art Berger, Chair of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee delegated his authority to hear the Exception to Bruce
Maak, Chair of Screening Panel B.3 After reviewing the Screening Panel record
and hearing argument from Mr. Nemelka and the OPC, Mr. Maak found that Mr.
Nemelka had failed to carry his burden under Rule 14-510(c) of showing that the
Screening Panel's recommendation of public discipline should be overturned

2

Appellant's Addendum "D."
Appellee's Addendum (000009-000010). (Mr. Maak is Chair of Screening Panel B1 which is a
different screening panel than B2, the Screening Panel that heard the original evidence).
3

2

even though he found that two of the rule violations were not supported by
substantial evidence. In other words, Mr. Nemelka had not met his burden of
showing

that

the

recommendation

to

publically

reprimand

him

was

"unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and
otherwise clearly erroneous."4
On May 23, 2008 Mr. Nemelka filed a Petition for Review with the Utah
Supreme Court requesting review of an administrative action. The Court by sua
sponte motion dismissed the petition. On June 19, 2008 Mr. Nemelka filed his
Petition for Extraordinary Relief which the Court granted. On July 23, 2008 the
Court ordered the parties to brief their respective positions.
Disposition at Trial Court or Agency: On May 13, 2008, Mr. Nemelka
received a Public Reprimand from the Ethics and Discipline Committee.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Mr. Nemelka was notified that a Screening Panel Hearing would be held
with respect to a complaint filed against him by Tina Simmons Pugh, a former
client of his. The OPC presented the results of its investigation to the Screening
Panel which included all of the documents provided to the OPC by both Mr.
Nemelka and Ms. Pugh. Mr. Nemelka testified at the Hearing, but called no
witnesses.
Hearing.

Ms. Pugh was also present and testified at the Screening Panel
Upon considering the evidence the Screening Panel found by a

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Nemelka had violated the following
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.3 (Diligence); Rule
1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating
_

3

Representation); and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct).5

The Screening Panel also

considered and found that several aggravating circumstances applied pursuant
to Rule 14-607 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions including: (a) a
pattern of misconduct; (b) multiple offenses; (c) refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or to the
disciplinary authority; (d) vulnerability of the victim; and (e) Mr. Nemelka's
substantial experience in the practice of law.6
The Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Nemelka receive a Public
Reprimand based upon its findings of the facts and application of the aggravating
factors. The Screening Panel Chair issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand on June 29, 2007.
As provided for in the rules, Mr. Nemelka filed an Exception to the
Findings and requested that a hearing be held.

7

At the Exception Hearing, Mr.

Nemelka, for the first time, requested that he be allowed to cross-examine Ms.
Pugh although Mr. Nemelka had not notified the OPC or Ms. Pugh that he was
requesting her presence.8 Mr. Nemelka then submitted a subpoena that had not
been issued by the district court according to the rules.9

Mr. Nemelka also

brought a witness to testify at the Exception Hearing when that witness had not

5

Appellant's Addendum "D" at 2.
Id. at 4.
7
Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010).
8
Mr. Nemelka attached a copy of the subpoena he apparently tried to serve. See Appellant's
Addendum "B".
9
Rule 14-503(g) of the RLDD states, u[a]ny party or a screening panel, for good cause shown,
may petition under seal the district court for issuance of a subpoena, subpoena duces tecum or
any order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal complaint. See Appellee's Addendum
000012.
6
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testified at the Screening Panel Hearing.
Mr. Maak considered these two issues at the outset of the hearing.

Mr.

Maak denied the request to allow Mr. Nemelka's witness to testify because he
should have testified at the Screening Panel Hearing.10

With respect to cross-

examining the complainant, Mr. Maak stated, "if Respondent had wished to
cross-examine Complainant at this hearing, he should have made note of that
fact when he filed his Exception."11
Mr. Maak

issued the

Ruling

on

Exception

to

Screening

Panel

Recommendation of Discipline on April 29, 2008. He found that Mr. Nemelka
had failed to carry his burden under Rule 14-510(c) that the Screening Panel's
recommendation of public discipline should be overturned.12 The Order of
Discipline: Public Reprimand was signed by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee on May 13, 2008.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Argument I. The issuance of a public reprimand was correct in this case
because there was substantial evidence presented that Mr. Nemelka violated
several of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that numerous aggravating
factors applied. The Screening Panel correctly applied the Standards of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability to the facts of this case taking into consideration all of
the evidence presented.

Mr. Nemelka has failed to marshal all of the facts

necessary for this Court to review those facts and draw any different inferences

10

Appellant's Addendum "E".
Id.
12
Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010).
11
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and, therefore the Court should hold that the Committees' determination was not
clearly erroneous.
Mr. Nemelka has also had the Screening Panel recommendation reviewed
at an Exception Hearing. Mr. Maak, who presided over the Exception Hearing,
found that the Screening Panel's findings and recommendation were correct. In
reviewing that decision within the Standards of Lawyer Discipline and Disability,
the Court shall also determine that a Public Reprimand is the correct sanction in
this case.
Argument II.

Mr. Nemelka was not denied due process when he was

unable to cross examine the Ms. Pugh because Mr. Nemelka had notice of the
hearing and could have either notified the OPC of his intent to have Ms. Pugh be
present or he could have obtained a correctly issued subpoena with time enough
to enforce the subpoena for non compliance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ISSUSANCE OF A PUBLIC REPRIMAND WAS CORRECT

A. The Ethics and Discipline Committee's Findings Of Fact Are Not
Clearly Erroneous.
In reviewing attorney discipline cases, this Court will review the trial court's
finding of facts under the clearly erroneous standard, reserving the right to draw
different inferences from the facts.13

While the standard necessarily applies to

"trial court's" findings, the OPC submits that this is the appropriate standard for
cases such as this one where the Court reviews the decision of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee.

The Court may draw its own inferences from the facts in

6

the record as a whole.

In order for the Court to draw its own inferences,

however, Mr. Nemelka must bring all of the facts before the Court. Mr. Nemelka
must marshal the facts supporting his arguments on appeal and also those that
do not support his arguments so that the Court may make its own inferences.
The actual facts found by the Screening Panel were the following: (a) Mr.
Nemelka was hired by Tina Simmons Pugh to represent her in divorce
proceedings; (b) Mr. Nemelka provided opposing counsel with his client's
unedited personal notes attached to his discovery responses; (c) Ms. Simmons
Pugh's confidential material was attached without her consent; (d) Mr. Nemelka
failed to provide discovery requests to his client before the deadline to respond
had passed and that this failure subjected his client to a Motion to Compel; (e)
Mr. Nemelka refused to promptly provide his client with a copy of her file after
she terminated representation; and (f) Mr. Nemelka later requested that his client
personally appear at his office to pick up file and that at that time Ms. Simmons
Pugh was served with a complaint for unpaid attorney's fees.14
The Screening Panel had before it documents supporting the complaint
against Mr. Nemelka as well as documents that he provided to the Panel in his
own defense. Based upon its review of the documents and the testimony of both
Mr. Nemelka and Ms. Pugh, the Screening Panel found that Mr. Nemelka
violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct during his representation of
Ms. Pugh, The Screening Panel found that Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 1.3 by

" Appellee's Addendum (000014-000021). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 883 (Utah 2001), see
also, In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998); In re Babilis, 951 P 2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997).
14
Appellant's Addendum UD" at 2.

7

"failing to provide timely response to discovery requests and by subjecting his
client to an unnecessary Motion to Compel."15 The Screening Panel found that
Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 16 by "providing his client's unedited personal notes
as discovery responses with confidential material attached without his client's
consent."16
The Screening Panel found that Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 1.16(d) by
"refusing to promptly provide his client with a copy of her file after she terminated
the representation and then having his client come to his office to retrieve the file
so he could serve her with a Complaint for collection of his fees."17 Mr. Nemelka
violated Rule 8.4(a), according to the Screening Panel, by violating the other
Rules of Professional Conduct.18
The Panel found that Mr. Nemelka's misconduct was substantial enough
to recommend a Public Reprimand. Rule 14-605(c) of the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions states that a public reprimand is generally appropriate when "a
lawyer negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a),
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party,
the public, or the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding . .
,."19 The Panel also found that aggravating factors applied to Mr. Nemelka as
follows:
1. A pattern of misconduct;
2. Multiple offenses;

15

Appellant's Addendum "D" at 3.
Id
17
Appellant's Addendum "D" at 4.
18
Id
19
Appellee's Addendum (000023).
16

8

3. Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved,
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
4. Vulnerability of victim;
5. Substantial experience ih the practice of law.20
The crux of Mr. Nemelka's argument with respect to the facts is that the
Screening Panel failed to find by a preponderance of the evidence in his favor,
Mr. Nemelka wants this Court to consider only the facts that would support his
side of the story and overturn the Ethics Committee's decision. For example, Mr.
Nemelka states as fact that "[t]he Screening Panel found that Petitioner had
attached Ms. Pugh's written responses to interrogatories (Addendum A) to the
formal answer without her consent and that the same was a disclosure of
confidential material even though Ms. Pugh reviewed the formal answers to
interrogatories which contained her written responses and then signed the
same."21

The first point about Mr. Nemelka's statement is that it contains

opinions and conclusions.

Secondly, Mr. Nemelka suggests that the one

document he provided as Addendum A was the only document attached to the
Interrogatories. It was not. There were numerous other documents attached
which the Screening Panel found contained confidential information.22
In reviewing the facts under the clearly erroneous standard, the Court
must look at all of the facts found below.

The Court may draw different

inferences from facts, however, Mr. Nemelka is still required to marshal the facts
on both sides so that this Court may review the entire record as the Screening
Panel had before it.

21
22

Appellant's Brief at 4.
Appellee's Addendum (000026-000051).

9

Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding."23 This Court has said that in order to pass this threshold,
"parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support of the
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support
the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."24
The Court warned that when parties fail to fulfill the marshalling requirement, the
Court may "rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings in fact."25
In this appeal, Mr. Nemelka falls woefully short of meeting this marshalling
requirement. His statement of facts is not really a statement of facts, but rather
his opinions and conclusions about the record, Mr. Nemelka has also failed to
provide all of the documents that were submitted to the Screening Panel and
upon which it rendered it's decision that Mr. Nemelka violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct. That being the case, it is impossible for this Court to draw
its own inferences and the Court must rely upon the finder of fact in the case.
B. The Imposition of a Public Reprimand was the Appropriate Sanction
Given Mr, Nemelka's Conduct.
Following the issuance of the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Mr.
Nemelka afforded himself of the opportunity of having that determination
reviewed by filing an Exception and requesting an Exception Hearing. Overall,
according to Mr. Bruce Maak, who presided over the hearing, the

" Appellee's Addendum (000052-000055).
24
Appellee's Addendum (000056-000064); United Park v. Stichting, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah
2006).
25
Id. at 1207.
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recommendation of a Public Reprimand was correct and Mr. Nemelka has not
met his burden of showing that the Public Reprimand was arbitrary, capricious
not supported by substantial evidence and otherwise an abuse of discretion.26
Prior to the Exception Hearing, Mr. Maak reviewed the entire record that
had been presented at the Screening Panel hearing and also reviewed the
Screening Panel video tape. Mr. Maak found that that there was not sufficient
evidence in the record to uphold two of the rule violations found by the Screening
Panel. Even so, the other four Rule violations were substantially supported by the
evidence in the record and, in light of the aggravating factors, the Public
Reprimand was still the appropriate sanction.27
Specifically, Mr. Maak found; (a) the fact that Complainant "signed the
interrogatory answers does not necessarily establish that she intended the notes
to be attached verbatim - she may have expected [Mr. Nemelka] to draft
appropriate attachments, which is what Complainant said was to occur.

The

Screening Panel accepted Complainant's version of things, and [Mr. Nemelka]
has not carried hrs burden on this point to show that its recommendation was
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and
otherwise clearly erroneous;"28 (b) there was "substantial evidence supporting the
Screening Panel's decision that [Mr. Nemelka] did not timely supply Complainant
with a copy of her file upon her request, which is not necessarily dependent upon

Appellant's Addendum "E".

11

the Court formally granting a Motion to Withdraw. Because [Mr. Nemelka] had,
according to Complainant, previously purported to withdraw and refused to
communicate further with her about her case, it was incumbent upon [Mr.
Nemelka] promptly to make available her file or at least a copy thereof so that
she could obtain other counsel and participate in the proceedings and not await
the Court's order allowing [Mr. Nemelka's] withdrawal.

[Mr. Nemelka] has

therefore not carried his burden under Rule 14-510(c)."29
Even though Mr. Maak also found that "the record did not support the
Screening Panel's findings of violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3" he determined that
overall this finding did not "under Rule 14-510(c) render improper the
recommendation of public discipline based on the other grounds addressed [in
the ruling]."30 On review, Mr. Maak considered the record thoroughly and found
that two of the rule violations were not supported. Even so, Mr. Maak found that
the recommendation for a Public Reprimand was correct in light of the facts in
the record, the standards and aggravating factors.
In imposing the appropriate sanction the Screening Panel had considered
the following rules:
Rule 14-605(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate
when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law.31
29

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
31
Appellee's Addendum (000023).

30
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Rule 14-607(a) After misconduct has been established,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered and
weighed in deciding what sanction to impose.
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree
of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may
include:
(a)(1) prior record of discipline;
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct;
(a)(4) multiple offenses;
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim;
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.32
"Respondent's Exception to the recommendation of discipline of the
Screening Panel is denied.

Respondent has failed to carry his burden to

establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the Screening Panel's recommendation of
public discipline should be overturned."33
Under the second prong of the standard for review of attorney discipline
cases, this Court will make a determination of the correctness of the sanction
imposed.

In fact, this Court has said that it is required constitutionally to make

an independent determination as to the correctness of the discipline imposed.34
In reviewing the record and applying the Standards along with the aggravating

32

Id.
Appellant's Addendum "E" at 8.
34
Appellee's Addendum (000014-000021). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d at 883-884; citing Ince, 957
) OW o f <*OQC
P.2d
at 1236.
33
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circumstances, the Court should determine that a Public Reprimand is the correct
sanction for Mr. Nemelka's misconduct.
A Public Reprimand is appropriate based on Mr. Nemelka's violation of
Rules 1.6, 1.16 and 8.4(a). Mr. Nemelka's violation of Rule 1.6 is based on the
factual finding that he attached Ms. Pugh's confidential information to Answers to
Interrogatories without her permission. Mr. Nemelka did not prepare Answers
based upon the proposed answers provided by his client, but simply attached her
answers with handwritten notes to him and cross-outs that still revealed the
information she wanted kept out.35 Moreover, Mr. Nemelka attached all of the
documents Ms. Pugh sent for his review, including documents that were found by
the Screening Panel to be confidential. Notably, Mr. Nemelka's Addendum does
not include the full compliment of documents which he attached to the Answers
to Interrogatories.36
Mr. Nemelka also violated Rule 1.16 when he refused to return Ms. Pugh's
file after his services were terminated. He then requested Ms. Pugh come to his
office to pick up the file and when she did served her with a Complaint in his debt
collection against her. Rule 1.16 requires attorneys to protect their client's rights
when they withdraw or are terminated. It requires that attorneys promptly return
the client's file. Mr. Nemelka did neither of those. Mr. Nemelka violated Rule
8.4(a) when he violated the other Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions require a Public Reprimand
be imposed when misconduct is negligent and causes harm. In this case the

35
36

See Appellant's Addendum at "A".
See Appellee's Addendum at (000026-000051).
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client was harmed and the legal system was harmed. Thus a Public Reprimand
would be the presumptive discipline to impose.

Moreover, in Mr. Nemelka's

case, the Screening Panel assigned several aggravating circumstances that
applied in Mr. Nemelka's case. With the addition and consideration of numerous
aggravating circumstances along with a presumption that the correct discipline is
a Public Reprimand, the Ethics Committee was correct in imposing the Public
Reprimand.

II.

MR. NEMELKA WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS

Mr. Nemelka claims that he was not afforded reasonable due process at
the Exception Hearing because he was not allowed to introduce the testimony of
a witness who had not testified at the Screening Panel hearing. He also
complains that he was not allowed to cross-examine the complainant at the
Exception Hearing and that this made the hearing unfair. Rule 14-510(c) details
the requirements for a fair exception hearing as follows:
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten
days after notice of the recommendation of an admonition or public
reprimand to the Committee chair, the respondent may file with the
Committee chair an exception to the recommendation and may
also, if desired, request a hearing. If a request for a hearing is
made, the Committee chair, or a screening panel chair designated
by the Committee chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an
expeditious manner, with OPC counsel and the respondent having
the opportunity to be present. The complainant's testimony may be
read into the record. The complainant need not appear personally
unless called by the respondent as an adverse witness for
purposes of cross-examination. The respondent shall have the
burden of proof of showing that the recommendation is
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary,
capricious and otherwise clearly erroneous.37

37

Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010).
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The rule allows for cross-examination of the Complainant but only if he or
she has been called by the Respondent as an adverse witness for purposes of
cross-examination. Rather than making a request to either the OPC or the Ethics
and Discipline Committee Chair, Art Berger, that Ms. Pugh be present at the
Exception Hearing as part of his Exception Hearing request, Mr. Nemelka
appeared at the Exception Hearing and indicated that he wanted to crossexamine Ms. Pugh. He further stated that he had attempted to subpoena her and
was unsuccessful in his attempt.38 Mr. Nemelka's subpoena had not been issued
by any court and his request to cross-examine Ms. Pugh was untimely.
In actuality, Rule 14-503 addresses the appropriate procedure for issuing
a subpoena in an attorney discipline matter prior to a formal complaint being filed
in district court. Rule 14-503 states: "[a]ny party or a screening panel, for good
cause shown, may petition under seal the district court for issuance of a
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum or any order allowing discovery prior to the
filing of a formal complaint. Except for good cause shown, all petitions under this
rule shall require a five-day written notice to the opposing party prior to the
issuance of an appropriate order of subpoena."39
Mr. Nemelka filed his Exception on July 23, 2007. He was notified of the
date of the hearing on April 9, 2008. Still he did not let the OPC know that he
wished to cross-examine the Complainant prior to the hearing and did not
properly request a subpoena to be issued by the court in order for her to be there
at the hearing. Mr. Maak addressed the issue at the hearing and found that Mr.

38
39

See Appellant's Brief at 5 and Appellant's Addendum "B".
Appellee's Addendum (000011-000013).
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Nemelka had not timely made his request known and therefore the hearing would
go forward without the Complainant. It should be noted that Ms. Pugh was
present at the Screening Panel hearing and Mr. Nemelka had the opportunity to
pose questions to the Panel which could be directed to Ms. Pugh although crossexamination is not allowed.40 This Court addressed cross-examination in the
Harding case and found that "[djirect and cross-examination of the witnesses is
not required in the quasi-administrative setting of the screening panel. As a
result, we find no due process deficiencies in Harding's case."41 As such, it
appears that the lack of cross-examination in this case did not violate Mr.
Nemelka's due process rights,
Mr. Nemelka also claims that his due process rights were denied when his
witness was not allowed to testify at the Exception Hearing. Since the Exception
Hearing is for review of the Screening Panel record, new evidence is not
pertinent.

Mr. Maak denied the request on the ground that "such testimony

should have been given at the Screening Panel hearing."42

Rule 14-510(b)(2)

affords "the respondent an opportunity to appear before the screening panel and
testify under oath, together with any witnesses called by the respondent. . ,."43
Due process requires that Mr. Nemelka be afforded a fair hearing. The
Rules Governing the Utah State Bar set forth the requirements for fair hearings in

Generally, the Screening Panel's determination would not be such that cross-examination
would change the facts. The Respondent and Complainant's documents have been submitted,
the Screening panel asks questions of each to clarify if necessary and then makes a
determination.
41
Appellee's Addendum (000065-000070). In re Harding, 104 P.3d 1220 1225 (Utah 2004).
42
Appellant's Addendum "E" at 3.
43
Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010).
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attorney discipline cases.

Unless the Screening Panel or Exception Officer

strayed far outside the Rules, the hearings are presumed to be fair.
While it is somewhat unclear what other deprivations Mr. Nemelka is
alleging he argues that his rights were violated in the two instances cited above.
Mr. Maak addressed both of these issues prior to the Exception Hearing. His
rulings on these issues were within the guidelines of the rules and were not
unreasonable. Clearly, Mr. Nemelka had an opportunity to bring his witness to
the Screening Panel Hearing which would have been appropriate under the
rules. Furthermore, Mr. Nemelka had an opportunity under the rules to request
that the Complainant be present at the Exception Hearing and to have an
appropriate Subpoena issued in case she did not want to attend. Mr. Maak's
decisions in this regard were within the rules and very reasonable in light of the
timing of Mr. Nemelka's requests. Therefore, the Court should hold that Mr,
Nemelka's due process rights were not violated.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Nemelka has failed to show that the findings of fact giving rise to the
imposition of a Public Reprimand are clearly erroneous. He has also failed to
marshal the facts on both sides to allow this Court to draw any different
inferences. Under the standards, the imposition of a Public Reprimand in this
case was correct. Mr. Nemelka's argument that he was not afforded due process
also fails because the Ethics and Discipline Committee process was fair and
decisions made by Mr. Maak were reasonable given Mr. Nemelka's untimely
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requests.

Therefore, the Court should uphold the imposition of a Public

Reprimand in this case.

AA

DATED this T ? f — day of October, 2008.

UTAH-STATE BA

Barbara L. Townsend
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
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In the Matter of the Discipline of Paul R. Ince, Bar No. 04345.
No. 960298
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
957 P.2d 1233; 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53; 1998 Utah LEXIS 17
April 10,1998, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1] Third District, Salt Lake
Div. I. The Honorable William A. Thome.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant state bar
sought review of a decision of the Third District, Salt
Lake Division (Utah), which rejected the bar's request for
disbarment of appellee attorney.
OVERVIEW: A state bar appealed from the lower
court's denial of its request to disbar an attorney who
committed major acts of misconduct, including misappropriation of client and law firm funds, forgery, and
failure to disclose his misconduct to a subsequent employer. The lower court held that mitigating favors
weighed in favor of suspension rather than disbarment.
On appeal, the court noted that its constitutional responsibility under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4 required it to
make an independent determination of the correctness of
the discipline imposed by the lower court. The court
found that the attorney committed serious criminal offenses, that he did not report them until after his conduct
had been discovered, and that any remorse he showed
seemed to be motivated more from having been caught
than from regret due to the acts he committed. The court
took notice that the attorney committed multiple major
acts of misconduct, and that he was motivated by dishonesty. The court found that such factors far outbalanced any mitigating circumstances in this case.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision of the
lower court and ruled that the attorney must be disbarred.

Pensions & Benefits Law > Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) > Prohibited Transactions
> General Overview
[HN1] Under 29 U.S.CS. §§ 1106-1108, employees may
not use pension funds to make payment for a personal
residence.

Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings >
Appeals
[HN2] Under Utah Const, art VIII, § 4, the court plays a
special role in governing the practice of law. This role
includes overseeing the discipline of persons admitted to
practice law. Thus, while the court reviews the trial
court's findings of facts under the clearly erroneous standard, it reserves the right to draw different inferences
from the facts than those drawn by the trial court. With
respect to the discipline actually imposed, the court's
constitutional responsibility requires it to make an independent determination as to correctness.

Environmental Law > Litigation & Administrative Proceedings > Toxic Torts
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN3] Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer (a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious
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injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a
legal proceeding; (b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation
of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or (c) engages in
any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses >
Fraud > False Pretenses > Elements
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses >
Property Crimes > Larceny & Theft > General Overview
[HN4] Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405, a person
commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over
property of another by deception and with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses >
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN5] In the absence of truly compelling mitigating circumstances, the intentional misappropriation of client
funds is an act that merits disbarment.

Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN6] After an attorney's misconduct is discovered, restitution can be characterized simply as the honesty of
compulsion and may be evidence only of the lawyer's
ability to raise the money or desire to avoid being disbarred rather than of a sincere desire to rectify the
wrongdoing. On the other hand, an attorney who reports
his own misconduct prior to discovery and attempts to
make restitution even if he lacks the means to do so
completely should have those efforts accorded greater
weight in the determination of the sanction to be imposed.
COUNSEL: Stephen R. Cochell, Kate A. Toomey, Salt
Lake City, for Utah State Bar.
Paul R. Ince, Park City, for himself.
JUDGES: ZIMMERMAN, Justice. Chief Justice Howe,
Justice Durham, and Justice Russon concur in Justice

Zimmerman's opinion. Justice Stewart concurs in the
result.
OPINION BY: ZIMMERMAN
OPINION
[*1234] ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
The Utah State Bar ("the Bar") appeals from a district court order rejecting the Bar's request for the disbarment of Paul R. Ince. In its findings of fact, the district court determined that Ince had committed not less
than nineteen major acts of misconduct over a fifteenmonth period, including misappropriating law firm and
client fimds for his own use and benefit, forging documents to conceal an illegal transfer of pension funds, and
failing to disclose his misconduct to a subsequent employer. Despite finding that the generally appropriate
level of discipline fixed by the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions was disbarment, the court concluded
that mitigating factors weighed in favor of suspension.
The court [**2] then suspended Ince for fifteen months,
to be followed by twenty-four months of supervised probation. The Bar appeals, arguing that Ince should be disbarred. We agree and therefore reverse.
Before turning to the standard of review and analysis, we must engage in a fairly extensive discussion of
the facts leading up to the disbarment proceeding. From
1984 through March of 1994, when his conduct was discovered, Ince was employed by the law firm of Callister,
Duncan & Nebeker ("CD&N"). During several years of
his employment, Ince's family suffered numerous health
and financial problems. In September of 1992, Ince and
his wife happened upon a house for sale in Summit
County. Because of a dream Ince's wife had, the Inces
became fixated on purchasing that house. They listed
their own home for sale the next week, but by February
of 1993 it had not sold. The Inces had insufficient funds
to make the down payment on the Summit County house
but became convinced that purchasing it would alleviate
some of the difficulties they were suffering. At that time,
Ince decided to use $ 20,000 from his pension plan toward the down payment.
[HN1] Under ERISA and other applicable statutes,
employees may not use [**3] pension funds to make
payment for a personal residence. See generally 29
U.S.C. §§ 1106-08. However, Ince represented to Zions
Bank, the pension fund trustee, that he intended to use
the money solely for investment purposes to purchase a
lot adjacent to the Summit County home. This would
have constituted a permissible investment under the pension plan's self-directed investment option. To convince
CD&N and Zions Bank that he had in fact purchased the

ii\i\(\(\9s

Page 3
957 P.2d 1233, *; 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53;
1998 Utah LEXIS 17,**
adjacent lot, Ince produced a forged warranty deed and
two forged quitclaim deeds.
After purchasing the home, the Inces continued to
suffer financial difficulties. In an attempt to meet his
financial obligations, Ince engaged in a series of actions
designed to facilitate the misappropriation of money
from CD&N, including the following: Ince collected
payments totaling $ 1500 from firm clients but kept the
money for himself. He obtained checks from CD&N's
accounting department to cover fabricated fees or expenses and converted those funds to his personal use. For
instance, Ince obtained a check for approximately $ 2600
drawn on CD&N's trust account by telling the firm that
[*1235] the money was for a settlement closing and that
funds from [**4] the closing would be returned to the
trust account to cover the disbursement. He then forged
the endorsement on the check, used the money for his
mortgage payment, and failed to return the funds to the
trust account.
Ince also manipulated an account denominated the
"MSI Resolution Trust." Ince had established this account for the purpose of managing a client's funds for
settlements with various creditors, including CD&N.
Ince accepted two $ 5000 payments from the client--in
July and December of 1993. He deposited roughly half
of the July payment with CD&N as payment for services
rendered and kept the remainder, and he kept all of the
December payment, maintaining that it was a personal
gift to him from the client.
In another incident involving the MSI account,
Ince's brother, an attorney in Wyoming who was himself
having financial and professional difficulties, convinced
Ince to provide him with a check payable to his firm for
$ 15,000. The check was drawn on the MSI account even
though there was no connection between the client for
whom the MSI account had been established and Ince's
brother's firm. The check was presented for payment
earlier than Ince anticipated and was dishonored [**5]
due to insufficient funds. Ince's brother then persuaded
Ince to write a letter to his Wyoming firm on CD&N
letterhead providing a falsified explanation of why the
first check had failed to clear.
In March of 1994, CD&N discovered Ince's misuse
of the pension fund and the related forgeries. Ince offered to resign, and CD&N accepted this offer. After
Ince's resignation, CD&N discovered additional misconduct. When confronted, Ince admitted the acts which had
been discovered, but he did not volunteer information
regarding his still undiscovered misdeeds. Eventually,
Ince asked to speak to CD&N's management for the supposed purpose of making a full disclosure and arranging
to repay all amounts he had misappropriated. Even then,
however, he failed to reveal his misconduct regarding the

two $ 5000 payments to the MSI account that were intended for payment of fees due to Ince's firm. ' CD&N
discovered these transactions in subsequent weeks, and
when confronted, Ince agreed to make restitution. Ince
sold the house in Summit County and other property to
raise the necessary funds. All money owed to CD&N
was repaid within a few months of Ince's resignation.
1
Although Ince maintained that the second
payment was intended as a gift to him, the trial
court specifically found that the payments were
intended for CD&N.
[**6] In May of 1994, after his misconduct had
been discovered by CD&N, Ince contacted the Bar and
met with the chief disciplinary counsel, to whom he disclosed the general nature of his misconduct. CD&N filed
a complaint against Ince with the Bar a few weeks later.
After his resignation in March, Ince began looking for a
new job. In May of 1994, Ince interviewed for and
eventually obtained a position in the Child Protection
Division of the Utah Attorney General's office. While
Ince implied during his interview that his departure from
CD&N had occurred under disagreeable circumstances,
he did not fully disclose the situation or give any indication that it had come about as a result of his own misconduct. The Attorney General's office hired Ince without contacting anyone at CD&N. A year and a half later,
the Attorney General's office learned of Ince's misconduct and fired him.
The Bar filed a formal complaint against Ince in
June of 1995. The district court conducted a trial in April
of 1996. The court found that although disbarment was
the "generally appropriate1' sanction for Ince's misconduct, "mitigating circumstances outweighed the misconduct" Therefore, the court ordered Ince [**7] suspended
for fifteen months, to be followed by twenty-four months
of probation during which time Ince would have to disclose his misconduct prior to handling any client funds
and would have to perform thirty hours of community
service per month.
On appeal, the Bar argues that the district court gave
undue weight to mitigating evidence and that Ince should
be disbarred. The Bar also requests that we adopt a rule
[*1236] that absent extremely compelling circumstances, an attorney who intentionally misappropriates
funds, whether from his client or from his law firm,
should be disbarred. Ince declined to file a brief in opposition to the Bar's appeal but did appear at oral argument.
We begin our analysis by determining the correct
standard of review. In 1993, this court adopted the Utah
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("Rules of
Lawyer Discipline"). The Rules of Lawyer Discipline
effected a major change in the procedure followed in
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attorney discipline cases by transferring jurisdiction over
formal Bar complaints from the Board of Bar Commissioners to the district courts. See In re Discipline of
Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1997). Under the revised procedure, the district court [**8] conducts a trial
and enters an order of discipline that is a final order unless appealed. Id. at 213. In our recent opinion In re
Discipline of Babilis, we set forth a general outline of the
revised procedures and addressed the application of the
standard of review to these revised disciplinary procedures. We briefly reiterate that standard here.
[HN2] Under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, this court plays a special role in governing the
practice of law. This role includes overseeing the discipline of persons admitted to practice law. See id. at 213.
Thus, while we review the trial court's findings of facts
under the clearly erroneous standard, see State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994), we reserve the right
to draw different inferences from the facts than those
drawn by the trial court. See Babilis, 951 P.2d at 21L
With respect to the discipline actually imposed, our constitutional responsibility requires us to make an independent determination as to its correctness. See id.
Moving to our analysis, the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions ("the Standards"), which were adopted
at the same time as the Rules of Lawyer Discipline,
[**9] provide six rules to guide courts in determining
the proper sanction to impose on an attorney who violates the standards of ethical conduct. See id. at 211. The
first three rules set forth the purpose of the Standards, a
general overview of the scope of the available sanctions,
and the factors to be considered in imposing sanctions.
The remaining three rules govern the determination of
the sanctions to be applied in a given case. Rule 4 establishes the "generally appropriate" or presumptive level of
discipline that should be imposed. Rule 5 addresses cases
in which a prior order of discipline has been entered, and
rule 6 provides for the consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in the ultimate determination of
what sanction should be imposed. See id. at 212-13.
Rules 4 and 6 are the rules with which we are concerned in this case. As stated earlier, the district court
found that "absent aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate discipline is disbarment." Rule
4.2 sets forth the circumstances under which disbarment
is generally appropriate. It states:
Rule 4.2 Disbarment
[HN3] Disbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer:
(a) [**10] knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d). (e), or (f) of the

Rules of Professional Conductp ] with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
2 The referenced portion of rule 8.4 states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice;
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official;
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable
Rules of Judicial Conduct or other law[.]
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary
[**11] element of which includes [*1237] intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation
of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law.
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Rule 4.2. As
we noted in Babilis, there is no requirement that all three
subdivisions of rule 4.2 be violated for disbarment to be
the presumptively appropriate sanction. See 951 P.2d at
215. A finding that any one of (a), (b), or (c) has been
violated is sufficient. See id.
In this case, Ince's conduct clearly falls within rule
4.2. Most notably, rule 4.2(b) refers to "serious criminal
conduct, a necessary element of which includes . . . false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft." lnce committed numerous crimes involving these elements. For example, [**12] he committed theft on several occasions by taking for his own
use and benefit payments from clients that were supposed to be transmitted to CD&N. See [HN4] Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-405 ("A person commits theft if he obtains
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or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof."). He
also stole client funds when he billed Zions Bank for
fabricated expert witness fees.
In Babilis, we stated that [HN5] in the absence of
truly compelling mitigating circumstances, the intentional misappropriation of client funds is an act that merits disbarment. 951 P.2d at 217. The Bar urges us to
adopt the same posture toward intentional misappropriation of law firm funds, and we do so today. The fact that
the majority of the money Ince stole came from his law
firm rather than from a client neither changes the essential nature of his conduct nor makes it any less serious.
The conduct still falls within the confines of rule 4.2(b).
In addition to committing theft, Ince also committed
several acts of forgery-altering a trust deed, forging
quitclaim and warranty deeds, and forging an endorsement on a check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (defining forgery). [**13] Ince's acts could have been
prosecuted as felonies or misdemeanors and clearly constitute serious criminal conduct for the purposes of rule
4.2(b). Furthermore, several of Ince's acts, although not
criminal in nature, satisfy the requirements of 4.2(c). In
particular, Ince's conduct with regard to the $ 15,000
check he wrote against the MSI account and the subsequent letter explaining why that check bounced were
intentional acts involving dishonesty and deceit. These
acts seriously adversely reflect on Ince's fitness to practice law, thereby making disbarment the presumptively
appropriate sanction.
Once a trial court determines the presumptive level
of discipline, it may apply rule 6 and consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding what
sanction should ultimately be imposed. Because rule 6
does not provide any guidance as to how these circumstances are to be weighed, the process of applying them
is necessarily somewhat subjective. However, one of the
concerns that prompted the adoption of the present Standards was that under the prior disciplinary regime, there
was no detailed set of guidelines that defined the sanction generally appropriate for a given type of [**14]
misconduct. Thus, discipline under the old regime had
something of an ad hoc quality, and there was the possibility, if not the probability, that similarly situated individuals might not receive similar sanctions. See Babilis,
951 P.2d at 211-12; see id. at 218 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Although the new Standards are intended to
preserve a measure of flexibility in assigning sanctions,
the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the uncertainty that existed under the old rules. Therefore, we
offer the following guidance as to the application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under rule 6.

To justify a departure from the presumptive level of
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and
mitigating [*1238] factors must be significant. In this
case, we find that the district court accorded too much
weight to mitigating factors which were not particularly
compelling. This is especially true given the number of
aggravating factors that existed. Thus, the weight of the
mitigating factors is at least balanced by the aggravating
factors. Under such circumstances, no adjustment to the
presumptively appropriate level of discipline is warranted.
To elaborate, the [**15] district court found that the
following mitigating factors weighed in favor of suspension: Ince (1) had no previous record of discipline: (2)
had personal or emotional problems during the relevant
time frame; (3) made timely, good faith restitution of the
money owed to his employer: (4) enjoyed a good reputation both before and after his misconduct; (5) exhibited
remorse and interim reform and did not commit any further misconduct; and (6) demonstrated good work in the
Child Protection Division of the Attorney General's office following his resignation from CD&N.
The court also found the following aggravating factors: (1) Ince's conduct demonstrated a dishonest motive
(the misconduct was motivated by the desire to support a
lifestyle he could not afford); (2) Ince engaged in a pattern of misconduct; (3) Ince committed multiple offenses—nineteen major acts of misconduct over a fifteenmonth period; and (4) the conduct was illegal.
There are a number of general statements which can
be made about the mitigating factors the court found to
exist in this case and how much weight they should be
accorded. First, Ince's restitution should not be given
much weight because it was made only [**16] after his
misconduct had been discovered and he had been confronted by CD&N. [HN6] After an attorney's misconduct
is discovered, restitution can be characterized simply as
the "honesty of compulsion" and may be evidence only
of the lawyer's ability to raise the money or desire to
avoid being disbarred rather than of a sincere desire to
rectify the wrongdoing. In re Wilson, 81 N.J, 451, 409
A.2d 1153, 1156 (NJ. 1979), On the other hand, an attorney who reports his own misconduct prior to discovery and attempts to make restitution even if he lacks the
means to do so completely should have those efforts accorded greater weight in the determination of the sanction to be imposed.
The same reasoning applies to Ince's voluntary reporting of his misconduct to the Bar. This disclosure
took place only after his misconduct had been discovered
by CD&N. At that point, Ince could reasonably anticipate that CD&N would report him to the Bar. Therefore,
his disclosure was self-serving. In contrast, an attorney
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who reports his own misconduct to the Bar prior to discovery, perhaps knowing that the misconduct might not
ever be discovered, would certainly be entitled to have
this voluntary disclosure [**17] weighed heavily as a
mitigating factor.
Furthermore, Ince's supposed interim remorse and
reform are not compelling. For example, when first confronted by CD&N with evidence of his misconduct, Ince
was not forthcoming. He repeatedly admitted to acts of
misconduct only when confronted with specific evidence
and was never completely willing to admit to undiscovered misconduct. 1 He then failed to disclose the true
reason for his resignation from CD&N to the Attorney
General. Rather than seeming truly sorry for his conduct
and admitting to it, Ince seemed sorry only that he had
been caught.
3 Although Ince did eventually disclose several
incidents of undiscovered misconduct to CD&N,
he did so only after significant prodding and was
never forthright with respect to his misconduct
involving the MSI account.
As for reform, Ince's position and reputed good
work with the Attorney General's office are not entitled
to significant weight. Because his position with the Attorney General did not involve control over client [**18]
or state funds, Ince has not demonstrated that he would

not fall victim to the same temptations if he again encountered financial difficulties at home. The fact that
witnesses testified that Ince did good work at the Attorney General's office is similarly unconvincing as these
character witnesses were not aware of the full extent of
Ince's malfeasance. Without this knowledge, their opinions expressing [*1239] disapproval of the Bar's efforts
to revoke ince's license were not fully informed.
In the final balance, we must consider all of the circumstances in light of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The primary purposes promoted by the
Standards are to protect the public and the judicial system and to uphold high standards of professionalism. The
presumptive sanctions the Standards set forth for various
types of misconduct are carefulJy calculated to further
those purposes. None of these purposes would be wellserved were we to uphold the decision of the district
court and allow an attorney who knowingly violated the
rules of professional conduct and stole money to support
a lifestyle beyond his means to continue practicing in the
absence of a significant imbalance of mitigating [**19]
and aggravating circumstances. Therefore, Ince must be
disbarred.
Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Justice
Russon concur in Justice Zimmerman's opinion.
Justice Stewart concurs in the result.
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Rule 14-510. Prosecution and appeals.
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct
(a)(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member of
the Bar by any person, OPC counsel or the Committee, by filing with the Bar, in
writing, an informal complaint in ordinary, plain and concise language setting
forth the acts or omissions claimed to constitute unprofessional conduct. Upon
filing, an informal complaint shall be processed in accordance with this article.
(a)(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be in any
particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal writing, although a
form may be provided by the OPC to standardize the informal complaint format. It
is unnecessary that the informal complaint recite disciplinary rules, ethical
canons or a prayer requesting specific disciplinary action. The informal complaint
shall be signed by the complainant and shall set forth the complainant's address,
and may list the names and addresses of other witnesses. The informal
complaint shall be notarized and contain a verification attesting to the accuracy of
the information contained in the complaint. In accordance with Rule 14-504(b),
complaints filed by OPC are not required to contain a verification. The substance
of the informal complaint shall prevail over the form.
(a)(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint, OPC counsel
shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the informal
complaint is sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not, OPC counsel shall
seek additional facts from the complainant; additional facts shall also be
submitted in writing and signed by the complainant.
(a)(4) Notice of informal complaint. Upon completion of the preliminary
investigation, OPC counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can
be resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and the complainant's
interest. OPC counsel and/or the screening panel may use their efforts to resolve
the informal complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be so resolved or if it sets
forth facts which, by their very nature, should be brought before the screening
panel, or if good cause otherwise exists to bring the matter before the screening
panel, OPC counsel shall cause to be served a NOIC by regular mail upon the
respondent at the address reflected in the records of the Bar. The NOIC shall
have attached a true copy of the signed informal complaint against the
respondent and shall identify with particularity the possible violation(s) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct raised by the informal complaint as preliminarily
determined by OPC counsel.
(a)(5) Answer to informal complaint. Within 20 days after service of the NOIC on
the respondent, the respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and signed
answer setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal
complaint, together with all defenses and responses to the claims of possible
misconduct. For good cause shown, OPC counsel may extend the time for the
filing of an answer by the respondent not to exceed an additional 30 days. Upon
the answer having been filed or if the respondent fails to respond, OPC counsel
shall refer the case to a screening panel for investigation, consideration and
determination. OPC counsel shall forward a copy of the answer to the
complainant.

(a)(6) Dismissal of informal complaint. An informal complaint which, upon
consideration of all factors, is determined by OPC counsel to be frivolous,
unintelligible, barred by the statute of limitations, more adequately addressed in
another forum, unsupported by fact or which does not raise probable cause of
any unprofessional conduct, or which OPC declines to prosecute may be
dismissed by OPC counsel without hearing by a screening panel. OPC counsel
shall notify the complainant of such dismissal stating the reasons therefor. The
complainant may appeal a dismissal by OPC counsel to the Committee chair
within 15 days after notification of the dismissal is mailed. Upon appeal, the
Committee chair shall conduct a de novo review of the file, either affirm the
dismissal or require OPC counsel to prepare a NOIC, and set the matter for
hearing by a screening panel. In the event of the chair's recusal, the chair shall
appoint the vice chair or one of the screening panel chairs to review and
determine the appeal.
(b) Proceedings before Committee and screening panels.
(b)(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts developed by the
informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, and the recommendations
of OPC counsel.
(b)(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may result in
the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal complaint, the
screening panel shall, upon at least 14 days notice, afford the respondent an
opportunity to appear before the screening panel and testify under oath, together
with any witnesses called by the respondent, and to present an oral argument
with respect to the informal complaint. All testimony shall be recorded and
preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and in any event, not less than
six months following the hearing. A written brief may also be submitted to the
screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall not exceed five pages in
length unless permission for enlargement is extended by the chair or the chair's
delegate for good cause shown. A copy of the brief shall be forwarded by OPC
counsel to the complainant.
(b)(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to appear
before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, together with any
witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to the informal complaint or in
opposition to the matters presented by the respondent. The complainant may be
represented by counsel or some other representative.
(b)(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall each
have the right to be present during the presentation of the evidence unless
excluded by the screening panel chair for good cause shown.
(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts developed by
the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the screening panel, in
behalf of the Committee, shall make one of the following determinations:
(b)(5)(A) that the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is
probable cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional
conduct, in which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel

shall promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant
and the respondent; or
(b)(5)(B) that a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed by OPC
counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the future
conduct of the respondent. Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the caution; or
(b)(5)(C) that a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by the
respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be
warranted by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall
state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such screening
panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of
the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an
order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent; or
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent receive a
public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and
shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and
the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public reprimand. A copy of
such screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior
to the delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee
chair shall enter an order publicly reprimanding the respondent if no exception
has been filed within ten days of notice of the recommendation being provided to
the respondent; or
(b)(5)(F) that a formal complaint be filed against the respondent
(b)(6) Determination of appropriate sanction. In determining an appropriate
sanction and only after having found unethical conduct, the screening panel may
consider any admonitions or greater discipline imposed upon the respondent
within the five years immediately preceding the alleged offense.
(b)(7) Continuance of disciplinary proceedings. A disciplinary proceeding may be
held in abeyance by the Committee prior to the filing of a formal complaint when
the allegations or the informal complaint contain matters of substantial similarity
to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation in which the
respondent is involved.
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten days after notice
of the recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand to the Committee
chair, the respondent may file with the Committee chair an exception to the
recommendation and may also, if desired, request a hearing. If a request for a
hearing is made, the Committee chair, or a screening panel chair designated by
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the Committee chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an expeditious manner,
with OPC counsel and the respondent having the opportunity to be present. The
complainant's testimony may be read into the record. The complainant need not
appear personally unless called by the respondent as an adverse witness for
purposes of cross-examination. The respondent shall have the burden of proof of
showing that the recommendation is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial
evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly erroneous.
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Rule 14-503. Ethics and Discipline Committee.
(a) Composition. The Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. The
Committee shall consist of eight public members and 26 members of the Bar who
have demonstrated a high standard of professional conduct All appointments
shall be for a term of three years. The Supreme Court shall designate one lawyer
member as Committee chair and one lawyer member as Committee vice chair.
Committee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms.
(b) Committee chair. The Committee chair shall supervise the Committee and
screening panels. The chair is responsible to maintain an adequate check on the
work of the screening panels to ensure that matters move forward expeditiously,
to determine that screening panels have a uniform basis for the judgments
rendered, and to provide the screening panels with information concerning ethics
and judicial decisions necessary to their activities. The chair shall make
recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning appointments to the
screening panels and reports concerning the activities of the screening panels
and the overall work of the Committee.
(c) Vice chair. The Committee vice chair shall act in the event of the chair's
absence or resignation. The chair may call upon the vice chair to assist in any of
the Committee chair's duties.
(d) Screening panels, quorums. The Committee members, except forrthe
Committee chair and Committee vice chair, shall be divided into four screening
panel sections of six members of the Bar and two public members. The Supreme
Court shall name a screening panel chair from each screening panel, who shall
preside over the screening panel. In the absence of the screening panel chair, a
screening panel vice chair designated by the screening panel shall preside. Two
members of the Bar plus one public member shall constitute a quorum of a
screening panel. The concurrence of a majority of those members present and
voting at any proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination. If
an even number of screening panel members participate in a proceeding, the
chair or vice chair shall not vote unless necessary to break a tie. The chair or
vice chair shall, however, fully participate in the proceeding. Each screening
panel shall meet as is necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its duties.
The entire Committee may be convened at such other times by the chair as
necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its duties.
(e) Resignations, alternates. If a Committee member does not attend three
consecutive scheduled screening panel hearings, that Committee member shall
automatically be deemed to have resigned his or her Committee appointment.
Members of any screening panel may serve as alternate members on different
screening panels. The Committee chair and the Committee vice chair may serve
as alternate members on all screening panels.
(f) Responsibilities. Informal complaints shall be randomly assigned to screening
panels. The screening panels shall review, investigate, and hear all informal
complaints charging unethical and/or unprofessional conduct against members of
the Bar. After such review, investigation, hearing and analysis, the screening
panels shall determine the action to be taken on any informal complaint which,

based upon the facts of the particular case, is most consistent with the public
interest and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(g) Subpoena. Any party or a screening panel, for good cause shown, may
petition under seal the district court for issuance of a subpoena, subpoena duces
tecum or any order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal complaint.
Except for good cause shown, all petitions under this rule shall require a five-day
written notice to the opposing party prior to the issuance of an appropriate order
of subpoena.
(g)(1) Enforcement of subpoena. A district court in the district in which the
attendance or production is required may, upon proper application, enforce the
attendance and testimony of any witnesses and the production of any documents
subpoenaed.
(g)(2) Quashing subpoena. Any attack on the validity of a subpoena so issued
shall be heard and determined by the Committee chair or by the court wherein
enforcement of the subpoena is being sought. Any resulting order is not
appealable prior to the entry of a final order in the proceeding.
(g)(3) Witnesses and fees. Subpoena fees, witness fees, and mileage shall be
reimbursed in the amounts provided under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(h)(1) Committee and OPC as screening panel secretary. OPC counsel shaH be
the secretary to the Committee and is charged with the responsibility of the
administrative affairs of the Committee, the handling of the screening panel
calendars, giving notice to screening panel members and members of the Bar
whose attendance is requested, notifying those who have filed informal
complaints of the times and dates their matters will be heard, and otherwise
performing or providing the secretarial and administrative functions of the
Committee and screening panels. Except as otherwise provided in this article,
whenever OPC counsel may be present before a screening panel during a
hearing, the respondent may also be present.
(h)(2) OPC counsel shall within three months after the filing of an informal
complaint of unprofessional or unethical conduct of a respondent, advise the
party making the informal complaint concerning the initial consideration of the
informal complaint, and shall promptly advise such party in writing of the
subsequent disposition of the informal complaint and the reasons therefor,
(i) Annual report. Senior counsel shall prepare and submit an annual report to the
Supreme Court and the Board encompassing the scope and nature of the
Committee work. The report shall be submitted on or about August 1 of each
year for the preceding fiscal year and shall set forth the number of disciplinary
cases investigated, the number brought before the Committee, formal complaints
filed, dispositions, cases dismissed, informal ethics opinions issued, diversionary
dispositions and such other information as may be helpful to the Supreme Court
in comprehending the operations of the OPC as well as the efficiency and
effectiveness of the disciplinary system. Such report may contain Committee
recommendations for rule amendments or changes in Committee procedure. The
chair and senior counsel shall annually consult with the Board and the Supreme
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Court regarding the level of activity and general standing of disciplinary matters
and procedures.

ifUflGIS

Page 1

LEXSEE48P.3D881

O
Analysis
As of: Oct 01, 2008
In the Matter of the Discipline of Jamis M. Johnson, No. 3937.
No. 990806
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2001 UT110; 48 PJd 881; 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 17; 2001 Utah LEXIS 195

December 18, 2001, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Rehearing denied by,
04/25/2002
Related proceeding at Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App
394, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 424 (2006)
PRIOR HISTORY:
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DISPOSITION:

Judgment of disbarment is affirmed.

CASE SUMMARY:

ownership of those funds, he was required to maintain
them in a separate trust account; (3) neither of the factors
the attorney presented as mitigating the presumptive
sanction of disbarment was truly compelling; but (4) the
attorney was entitled to a stay of judgment pending appeal so long as the likelihood of harm to the public during the pendency of appeal was slim.
OUTCOME: The judgment of disbarment was affirmed.
The trial court did not err in granting the attorney's motion for a stay pending appeal.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah, disbarred an attorney from the
practice of law for intentionally misappropriating client
funds, a violation of the Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.15. The
district court stayed the judgment pending appeal. The
Utah State Bar, through its Office of Professional Conduct (OPC), appealed from the order staying the judgment. The attorney cross-appealed from the judgment of
disbarment.
OVERVIEW: The attorney issued a check to a client in
settlement of an action. The client returned the check and
filed a complaint with the OPC. The complaint was dismissed, and the client requested the return of the settlement funds. The client filed another complaint with the
OPC. The attorney did not dispute the fact that he did not
return the $ 28,800 to his client, but used it for his own
personal purposes. The trial court found that he made no
satisfactory explanation for this failure. The Utah Supreme Court found that: (1) the attorney tendered $
28,800 as the client's portion of the settlement funds; (2)
pending resolution of the dispute with his client over

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
Clearly Erroneous Review
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings >
Appeals
[HN1] The Utah Supreme Court is charged with governing the conduct and discipline of those admitted to
practice law in Utah. Thus in reviewing attorney discipline cases, while the Utah Supreme Court reviews the
trial court's finding of facts under the clearly erroneous
standard, it reserves the right to draw different inferences
from the facts than those drawn by the trial court. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court's constitutional responsibility requires it to make an independent determination
as to the correctness of the discipline actually imposed.
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Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Misconduct & Unethical
Behavior > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > General Overview
[HN2] Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 3 provides
that after misconduct has been found, the factors to be
considered in imposing a sanction include: (a) the duty
violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or
actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d)
the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Misconduct <£ Unethical
Behavior > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN3] Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 4.2 additionally provides that an order disbarring an attorney is
generally appropriate absent mitigating or aggravating
circumstances when he or she: (a) knowingly engages in
professional misconduct as defined in Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 8.4(a), (d), (e), (f) with the intent
to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court,
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party,
the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation or an attempt or
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or (c) engages in any other intentional
misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses >
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN4] Intentional misappropriation of a client's funds
will result in disbarment absent truly compelling mitigating circumstances.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses >
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Client Funds
[HN5] Intentional misappropriation of a client's funds is
always indefensible; it strikes at the very foundation of
the trust and honesty that are indispensable to the functioning of the attorney-client relationship and, indeed, to
the functioning of the legal profession itself. The Utah
Supreme Court will not abide such conduct.

Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses >
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Client Funds
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > General Overview
[HN6] Although a good reputation and community service are commendable, they do not constitute truly compelling mitigating circumstances when there is a misappropriation of client's funds.

Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Client Funds
[HN7] The rules of professional conduct require that in
the case of a dispute over funds, the attorney is to maintain those funds in a separate trust account until the dispute is resolved. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(c).

Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN8] Once an attorney's conduct is found to fall within
Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 4.2, the presumptive sanction is disbarment. There is no additional burden
to show aggravating circumstances; the absence of aggravating factors is not a mitigating factor.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Mootness > Evading
Review Exception
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > General
Overview
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN9] The appellate court generally refrains from deciding moot questions because of its policy against issuing advisory opinions. However, some cases warrant an
exception to this policy because the issue is one of wide
public concern, and because of the short period any one
litigant is affected by it, the issue is capable of repetition
yet evading review.

Civil Procedure > Counsel > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings >
Appeals
[HN10] Utah R. Law. Disc. & Disability 17 provides that
unless otherwise noted, the Utah R. Civ. P., and the Utah
R. App. P. governing civil appeals apply in formal discipline actions. Utah R. Civ. P. 17.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Stays of Proceedings > General Overview
[HNll] Utah R. App. P. 8 provides that a stay of a
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal must
generally be sought in the district court. Utah R. Civ. P.
8.
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Kate A. Toomey, Salt Lake City, for the Utah State Bar.
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Stays of Proceedings > General Overview
[HN12] Utah R. Civ. P. 62 provides that a trial court can
grant a motion for stay pending appeal in its discretion
and on such conditions for the security of the adverse
party as are proper. Utah R. Civ. P. 62(a).

JUDGES: HOWE, Chief Justice. Associate Chief Justice Russon and Justice Durrant concur in Chief Justice
Howe's opinion. DURHAM, Justice, concurring and dissenting. WILKINS, Justice, concurring and dissenting.
OPINION BY: HOWE

Criminal Law <£ Procedure > Sentencing > Stays
Criminal Law <£ Procedure > Postconviction Proceedings > Stays of Judgments
Legal Ethics > General Overview
[HN13] Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's constitutional charge to govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline
of persons admitted to practice law, Utah Const, art.
VIII, § 4. it enunciates a standard to guide the discretion
of the district court in determining whether to stay a
judgment of sanction pending appeal of that judgment to
the Utah Supreme Court. When an attorney can meet the
burden of demonstrating to the trial court's satisfaction
that his or her continued practice of law pending appeal
does not pose a substantial threat of irreparable harm to
the public, the trial court may, in its discretion, grant the
stay. Under this standard, cases where the attorney's misconduct is a one-time incident as opposed to a pattern of
misconduct over a period of time will probably be the
most likely instances where a stay will be appropriate.
The Utah Supreme Court does not require, however, that
the attorney also demonstrate that he or she has issues
which are likely to result in reversal on appeal as it does
in criminal cases where a convicted criminal defendant
seeks a stay pending appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(d)(2).

Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Stays
Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceedings > Stays of Judgments
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings >
Appeals
[HN14] The discipline of an attorney is a civil case and
the ultimate power to discipline is vested in the Utah
Supreme Court under the Utah Constitution. The district
courts in hearing the discipline cases act only as the Utah
Supreme Court's agent. Because the private practice of
law cannot easily be stopped and started again, unless
there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the
public, a disbarred lawyer should be entitled to a stay of
judgment pending appeal to the Utah Supreme Court
where the final authority for discipline rests.

OPINION
[**882] HOWE, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] Attorney Jamis Johnson was disbarred from
the practice of law for intentionally misappropriating
client funds, a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct. The trial court stayed the judgment pending
any appeal. The Utah State Bar, through its Office of
Professional Conduct (OPC), appeals from the order
staying the judgment. Johnson cross-appeals from the
judgment of disbarment.

[**883] BACKGROUND
[*P2] In connection with his representation of a
client, Johnson settled a case for $ 50,000. He deposited
that money in a trust account as required by rule 1.15 of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and [***2] tendered a check in the amount of $ 28,800 to his client as
its share of the settlement. Upon receiving the check, the
client told Johnson it was going to return it to him because he did not have authority to settle for $ 50,000
without the client's consent. In a letter to his client dated
January 19, 1993, Johnson responded:
In our last conversation, you claimed to
have returned the trust account check I
sent you. I have not received that check. I
have therefore stopped payment on that
check.
If you want me to issue another check
I will, but I will await your instructions in
that regard.
In the meantime, I will hold the funds
in trust. If I am compelled to take any
further action on the matter, you will be
billed at the previously discussed rate of $
150.00 and I will, as the bill accrues, draw
down such legal fees out of the amount of
the trust account.

COUNSEL: Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Cameron S. Denning, Salt Lake City, for Johnson.
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(Emphasis added.) In a letter dated January 26, 1993,
Johnson's client responded:
I inadvertently failed to return the Trust
Account check. Please find it enclosed
herewith.
In response to your January 19, 1993
letter you may do as you wish with the
funds, but you should be aware that
[***3] you have not responded to our last
conversation in which I suggested that we
pursue arbitration or mediation. I am,
therefore, proceeding formally against
you under the laws of the State of Utah...
. . . Do not work on this matter or any
other matter related to [this client] or any
of its subsidiaries.

Johnson was granted a stay of the judgment of disbarment pending any appeal
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P3] [HN1] This court is charged with governing
the conduct and discipline of those admitted to practice
law in this state. Thus in reviewing attorney discipline
cases, "while we review the trial court's finding of facts
under the clearly erroneous standard, we reserve the right
to draw different inferences from the facts than [***5]
those drawn by the trial court." In re Discipline of 1nee,
957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted); see
also In re Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P2d207, 213 (Utah
1997). In addition, "our constitutional [**884] responsibility requires us to make an independent determination
as to the [correctness of the discipline actually imposed]." lncef 957 P.2d at 1236.
ANALYSIS

(Emphasis added.) The client then filed an informal
complaint with the OPC alleging that Johnson had settled
the case without authority; the complaint was later dismissed. Approximately fifteen months later, the client
demanded payment of the $ 28,800 by letter dated April
15, 1994. When Johnson had not returned the funds by
February 16, 1995, the client again sent a letter demanding payment within ten days. When the client did not
receive payment, it made a second informal complaint to
the OPC, alleging misuse of a client's funds. The OPC
subsequently filed a formal complaint against Johnson on
May 20, 1997, charging that he violated rule 1.15 of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by misappropriating
$ 28,800 of client money. The Bar moved for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted. Following a
sanctions hearing, the court disbarred Johnson for misappropriation [***4] of client funds based on the following findings of undisputed fact:
Johnson held the client's $ 28,800 in a trust account.
Mr. Johnson attempted to deliver the $ 28,800 to the
client and those funds were returned to Mr. Johnson . . . .
Mr. Johnson placed the client's $ 28,800 in trust and
agreed to hold the client funds in trust pending a resolution of their differences.
Thereafter the client requested the return of the
funds, but Mr. Johnson did not return the $ 28,800.
Mr. Johnson converted the $ 28,800 for his own use.
Mr. Johnson offered no satisfactory explanation of
why he kept the $ 28,800. His explanation of expenses
for the threatened malpractice action by the client against
Mr. Johnson is not a satisfactory explanation.

[*P4] We address first whether the trial court's
sanction of disbarment was appropriate and then turn to
the issue of whether Johnson was properly granted a stay
pending this appeal.
I. DISBARMENT SANCTION
[*P5] Attorney discipline sanctions are governed
by the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, chapter
15 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice.
These standards state that the purpose of sanctioning an
attorney is to ensure and maintain the high standard of
professional conduct required of those who undertake the
discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and
to protect the public and the administration of justice
from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct
that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge
[***6] properly their professional responsibilities.
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions rule 1.1.
[HN2] Rule 3 of those standards provides that after misconduct has been found, the factors to be considered in
imposing a sanction include
"(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors."
[*P6] [HNS] These rules additionally provide that
an order disbarring an attorney is generally appropriate
absent mitigating or aggravating circumstances when he
or she
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), 8.4(d), 8.4(e), or 8.4(f) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit
the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes
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serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public,
or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary
element of which includes intentional interference with
the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation . . . [***7]
or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to
commit any of these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law.
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions rule 4.2. '
1 Rule 6 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions allows a departure from the presumptive sanction based on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances to provide for the flexibility in discipline required by rule 1.3 of the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
[*P7] Subsection (a) above directs us to rule 8.4 of
the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for definitions
of professional misconduct sufficient to trigger the sanction of disbarment. The first subsection of rule 8.4 provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to
"violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or
do so through [***8] the acts of another." Utah R. Profl
Conduct 8.4(a).
[*P8] The trial court held that Mr. "Johnson violated rule 1.15(a), 1.15(b), and 1.15(c)... of the Rules of
Professional Conduct when he intentionally misappropriated [his client's] funds for his personal or business use."
After determining that Johnson had violated the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct, the trial court correctly
weighed mitigating and aggravating factors and determined that, although Johnson's conduct was not as egregious as that of other attorneys who have been disbarred
by this court in recent years, disbarment was the appropriate remedy under our case law because there were no
substantial mitigating circumstances. We agree.
[*P9] We held in Babilis that [HN4] intentional
misappropriation of a client's funds will result in disbarment absent "truly compelling mitigating circumstances."
951 P2d 207, 217 [**885] (Utah 1997). We set no
reason to deviate from this rule. The rule takes into consideration the factors listed in rule 3, including the duty
violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual
injury caused, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. As we stated [***9] in Babilis,

[ITN5] "intentional misappropriation of a client's funds is
always indefensible; it strikes at the very foundation of
the trust and honesty that are indispensable to the functioning of the attorney-client relationship and, indeed, to
the functioning of the legal profession itself." Id. We will
not abide such conduct.
[*P10] Johnson does not dispute the fact that he did
not return the $ 28,800 to his client upon demand. The
trial court found that he made no satisfactory explanation
for this failure. The court weighed the mitigating factors
presented by Johnson and determined that they were not
sufficient to warrant a lesser sanction. He contends that
he "has maintained a practice for many years, which includes significant pro bono work, involvement in community organizations, and a good reputation among his
fellows" and that he "is not the type of individual committing the type of acts" requiring disbarment. [HN6]
Although a good reputation and community service are
commendable, they do not constitute "truly compelling
mitigating circumstances" when there has been a misappropriation of client's funds. Id. at 217.
[*P11] In addition, Johnson contends [***10] that
the entire circumstances surrounding the misappropriation is a mitigating circumstance. Although he does not
dispute that he used the $ 28,800 for personal or business
purposes, he asserts that there is a question of fact about
whether the client was even entitled to that money. He
argues that when the client, after rejecting his tender of
the money, terminated the attorney-client relationship
and told him to do with the money what he would, his
own obligation to keep the money in trust ended. He
argues further that his client owed him money from other
transactions including fees for protecting his interest in
this case, and thus he was entitled to a portion of the $
28,800 he initially tendered. We disagree.
[*P12] [HN7] The Rules of Professional Conduct
require that in the case of a dispute over funds, the attorney is to maintain those funds in a separate trust account
until the dispute is resolved. Utah R. Profl Conduct
1.15(c). Johnson tendered $ 28,800 as the client's portion
of the settlement funds. Pending resolution of the dispute
with his client over ownership of those funds, he was
required to maintain them in a separate trust account. 2
Neither of the factors he presents [***1 1] as mitigating
the presumptive sanction of disbarment is "truly compelling," and we therefore affirm the trial court's order. 3
2 Even Johnson asserts that he was entitled only
to "an offset to some portion of the $ 28,800," not
the entire amount. He knew his client did not
mean to give him a gift of the money.
3 [HN8] Once an attorney's conduct has been
found to fall within rule 4.2 of the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the presumptive
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sanction is disbarment. There is no additional
burden to show aggravating circumstances; the
absence of aggravating factors is not a mitigating
factor.
[*P13] Johnson also contends that "absent a finding
by the trial court of 'serious criminal conduct'" his case
does not meet the requirements for presumptive disbarment in rule 4.2. We reject that argument here as we did
in Babilis. First, disbarment is appropriate when an attorney's conduct falls within any one of the three subsections of rule 4.2*. The trial court's finding that Johnson
knowingly violated [***12] rule 1.15 of the Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct for his own benefit was sufficient to support his disbarment. As we earlier stated, this
conduct seriously injures, at the very least, the public and
the legal system. Second, the intentional misappropriation of client funds falls within the description of "other
intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" referred to in subsection (c) of
rule 4.2. 4
4
Johnson also asserts that disbarment is too
harsh for his conduct because it "did not [even
approach] the dishonest, egregious conduct" of
Babilis. He argues instead that his situation is
more akin to that of In re Cassity, the case of an
attorney who was put on probation after receiving
a public reprimand for failing to remit to his client her rightful portion of settlement proceeds.
See In re Complaint of Cassity, 875 P.2d 548
(Utah 1994). Cassity was decided before we
enunciated a firm rule in Babilis and may well
have been decided differently today.
[***33] [**886] [*pi4] We do not administer
the sanction of disbarment lightly; we understand its
devastating effects on an attorney. However, we are
charged with protecting the public and the legal system
of our state from those attorneys who do not abide by
their professional responsibilities, and we cannot tolerate
the intentional misappropriation of a client's funds. Thus
we affirm the disbarment.
II. STAY PENDING APPEAL
[*P15] In appealing from the order granting Johnson's motion for a stay pending his appeal to this court,
the OPC seeks "guidance on the important issue of the
availability for stays of judgment in cases in which the
district court has determined that the attorney's misconduct is so serious that it warrants disbarment." Our resolution of this issue today cannot affect the parties in this
action and is therefore moot. [HN9] We generally refrain
from deciding moot questions because of our policy
against issuing advisory opinions. In re Giles, 657 P.2d
285, 286 (Utah 1982). However, this case warrants an

exception to this policy because the issue is one of wide
public concern, and because of the short period any one
litigant is affected by it, the issue is [***14] '"capable of
repetition yet evading review.'" ld.\ see also KUTV v.
Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1983); Wickham v.
Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1981).
[*P36] The standard a trial court must follow in
granting an attorney's motion for stay of a judgment of
sanction pending appeal of that judgment is a question of
first impression in this court. We look to the rules governing attorney discipline proceedings to resolve it.
[HN10] Rule 17 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability provides that unless otherwise noted, "the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, [and] the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure governing civil appeals . . . apply in
formal discipline actions." Utah R. Civ. P. 17. [HN11]
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a stay of a judgment or order of a district court
pending appeal must generally be sought in the district
court. Utah R. Civ. P. 8. [HN12] Rule 62 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court can
grant a motion for stay pending appeal "in its discretion
and on such conditions for the security of the adverse
party as are proper." Utah R. Civ. P. 62(a).
[*P17] [HN13] Pursuant to our [***15] constitutional charge to "govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline
of persons admitted to practice law," Utah Const art.
VIII, § 4, we enunciate a standard to guide the discretion
of the district court in determining whether to stay a
judgment of sanction pending appeal of that judgment to
this court. Rule 18(a) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability provides that a district court can grant a
motion for interim suspension when an attorney "poses a
substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public"
pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding.
Although we recognize that an order of interim suspension is different from a final judgment of sanction in that
the latter is based on a final determination of misconduct
following a trial, the standard fits well in both situations
and we adopt a modified version of it here. When an
attorney can meet the burden of demonstrating to the trial
court's satisfaction that his or her continued practice of
law pending appeal does not pose a substantial threat of
irreparable harm to the public, the trial court may, in its
discretion, grant the stay. Under this standard, [***16]
cases where the attorney's misconduct was a one-time
incident as opposed to a pattern of misconduct over a
period of time will probably be the most likely instances
where a stay would be appropriate. We do not require,
however, that the attorney also demonstrate that he or
she has issues which are likely to result in reversal on
appeal as we do in criminal cases where a convicted
criminal defendant seeks a stay pending appeal. See Utah
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R. Crim. P. 27(d)(2). [HIM 14] The discipline of an attorney is a civil case and the ultimate power to discipline is
vested in this court under the Utah Constitution. The
district courts in hearing the discipline cases act only as
our agent. Because the private practice of law cannot
easily be stopped and started again, unless there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public, a disbarred lawyer should be entitled to a stay [**887] of
judgment pending appeal to this court where the final
authority for discipline rests.
[*P18] The trial court found that "the likelihood of
harm to the public should Johnson be allowed to practice
law during the pendency of this appeal is slim." We
agree. Johnson's conduct warranting disbarment was a
serious one-time [***]7]~ offense and not a continuing
pattern of misconduct that was likely to recur while he
was allowed to continue to practice pending his appeal to
this court.
[*P19] The judgment of disbarment is affirmed.
The trial court did not en* in granting Johnson's motion
for a stay pending his appeal to this court.
[*P20] Associate Chief Justice Russon and Justice
Durrant concur in Chief Justice Howe's opinion.
CONCUR BY: DURHAM; WILK1NS
DISSENT BY: DURHAM; WILKINS
DISSENT
DURHAM, Justice, concurring and dissenting:
[*P21] I concur in Part 1 of the majority opinion,
but cannot join Part II. This court is charged by the Utah
Constitution with the obligation to regulate the practice
of law. We have delegated the screening, fact-finding,
and initial judgment regarding discipline to the Utah
State Bar and to the district courts, but we retain the final
authority to oversee the system. When the prosecuting
entity and the disciplined attorney accede to the appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the
trial courts, or at least fail to challenge it, we lend our
constitutional authority to the finality of the determination. Such trial court decisions, of course, create no
precedent [***18] for the disposition of other cases.
Where a sanction is challenged, however, this court undertakes a function that goes beyond the review of an
individual case. We arbitrate questions of proportionality, rules of law, and guidelines for the imposition of
sanctions that have general application for the practice of
law in Utah. Our decisions interpret the Rules of Professional Conduct and develop the principles of application
that will guide lawyers, the Bar, and the trial courts.

[*P22] Given the significance of our institutional
role in the process of imposing sanctions, 1 am troubled
by the procedural analysis of my colleagues. Disbarment
is the "ultimate" sanction in the context of disciplinary
proceedings. Once it is effected, there is, in a professional sense, no turning back. A disbarred lawyer must
instantly close his practice, dismiss his clients, and remove himself from all litigation and transactions in
which he has been engaged as a lawyer. There is little
likelihood that a practice could be restored or regenerated if this court were to reverse the sanction after appeal, particularly given the many months required to
resolve such appeals.
[*P23] Trial courts have [***19] a more limited
perspective on the disciplinary/ system than does this
court. A trial judge is often called on to "predict" the
answer to a question of first impression involving the
rules and the scope of appropriate sanctions. It is not at
all unexpected that a trial judge's best assessment of the
trend of developing law turns out to be "wrong" in the
sense that this court will reject it and opt for a different
interpretation or policy. Where the judgment is equivalent to a professional death penalty, I believe that this
court's review should precede execution.
[*P24] This case presents a useful example. The
facts ultimately support the sanction of disbarment, but it
is in my view a very close question. An otherwise upright and commendable lawyer has committed one enormous error of judgment and behavior, for which he is to
experience the complete loss of his career and reputation.
It has been a very difficult decision for at least this member of the court to disbar. Simultaneously, this lawyer's
misconduct, although meriting disbarment, constituted
no interim danger to the public whatsoever during the
pendency of the appeal. Had this court disagreed with the
trial judge on the [***20] sanction, and had there been
no stay of execution, a career might have been dismantled unnecessarily. I therefore take a view different from
any of those supported by my colleagues. I believe that
where disbarment is ordered by the trial judge and an
appeal is taken, there should be an automatic stay unless
there has been a showing sufficient to support an interim
suspension under rule 18(a), either in the trial court proceedings themselves or on motion by the Bar. I don't
want to overdo the analogy [**888] to the death penalty
in criminal cases, but I believe that the constitutional
underpinnings and institutional structure of our disciplinary system require this court's review and approval before a career is terminated.
WILKINS, Justice, concurring and dissenting:
[*P25] I concur in part I of Chief Justice Howe's
opinion. I respectfully dissent to part II. The trial court
should not have stayed the judgment.
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[*P26] 1 agree that once a judgment of disbarment
is entered by the trial court, the burden should be on the
lawyer to seek, and establish adequate grounds for, a stay
of the disbarment pending review by this court. The obligation is on the lawyer to prove [***21] the entitlement to a stay by demonstrating to the trial court that the
lawyer does not pose a substantial threat of irreparable
harm to the public during the course of the review.
Moreover, even making such a motion and showing
should not entitle the disbarred lawyer to a stay of the
disbarment pending review. Quite the contrary, the trial
judge, acting as our agent in this type of proceeding, has
broad discretion in deciding whether or not a stay is appropriate. In my opinion, we are unwise to create a presumption in favor of granting a stay. It would be better to
require the disbarred lawyer to convince the trial court,
or us, that he or she has a substantial likelihood of success on review by this court before granting a stay.

[*P27] At risk here is not only the livelihood of the
lawyer, but the confidence of the public in the court's
ability to police the ranks of those admitted to practice
law. An interim suspension should be imposed when
needed to protect the public. A disbarment should be
effective when entered by the trial court, under all but the
most unusual circumstances. Only when the lawyer can
demonstrate that the disbarment is likely to be reversed
on review [***22] by this court should the public be
required to suffer continued exposure to the disbarred
lawyer. Our duty to protect the public is higher than any
duty to the disbarred lawyer, once the lawyer has been
accorded a full measure of due process and evenhanded
justice by the trial court. Only when the quality of that
justice is in real doubt should a stay be granted.
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Rule 14-603. Sanctions.
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525.
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more
than three years.
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524.
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may be
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525.
(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519.
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the condupt of
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of
readmission or reinstatement
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of
law while either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the
respondent. Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in
Rule 14-521.
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be
imposed include:
(i)(1) restitution;
(i)(2) assessment of costs;
(i)(3) limitation upon practice;
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver;
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or professional
responsibility examination; and
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses.
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction.
Rule 14-604. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions.
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding
of lawyer misconduct:

(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
Rule 14-605. Imposition of sanctions.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a),
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the
lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale,
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a),
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in
Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a),
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party,
the public, or the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a),
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to
a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a legal proceeding,
but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this rule
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

f
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Rule 14-606. Prior discipline orders.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors
set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in cases involving
prior discipline.
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon a
lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order.
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer has
previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will generally be one level
more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously received, provided that the
harm requisite for the higher sanction is present.
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and mitigation.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to
impose.
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)(1) prior record of discipline;
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct;
(a)(4) multiple offenses;
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply
with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved,
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim;
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences
of the misconduct involved; and
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.
Mitigating circumstances may include:
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems;
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
the misconduct involved;
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law;
(b)(7) good character or reputation;
(b)(8) physical disability;

(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability;
and
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation; and
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that
the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay;
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or
impairment;
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(b)(13) remorse; and
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses.
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered
as either aggravating or mitigating:
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution;
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain.
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TINA S. PUGH,
Petitioner,
1

vs.
ROBERT K. PUGH,
Respondent.

PETITIONER'S ANSWERS TO
RESPONDENT'S
INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS
Civil No. 064900887
Judge Roth
Commissioner Casey

Petitioner Tina Simmons Pugh by and through her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka,
respectfully submit the following answers to Respondent's Interrogatories, Requests for
Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions:
INTERROGATORIES
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1 through 7: See answers to said Interrogatories
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
ANSWERS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 through 12:
Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 1 through 7: Deny each and every request..
DATED this / )

day of May, 2006.

Richard S. Nemelka
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

)ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
TINA SIMMONS PUGH being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states that
she is the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter and that she has read the foregoing Answers to
Respondent's Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for
Admissions, that she knows the contents thereof and acknowledges the contents therein and that
they are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief.
DATED this /A

day of May, 2006.

; / 7 r ^ f rr^t
ETNA SIMMOKS PUGH
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [fr

STEPHEN
NEMELKA!
E
i*6e south' 1300 &* 1

day of May, 2006.

Notary Public and Seal

NUfiG£7

Answers to Interrogatories
1. Loanology: $5.25 an hour, 40 hours a week
Commission average: $300 a month
2. Tarn seeldng alimony based on the fact that I moved out of my home, sold my car,
quit nryjob and started a new life with Robert. I was fine on my-erWn^Hll Robert
came alon^aiijimade me dependant upon him and his sppp^rt. He placed me in a
position were IcaJi^tcurrently provide for mysglf^nd will take some time to be
able to establish mysen^fe^acar, buy th^ircrtne I am in, and employment to
meet my needs. I have 5 cMldre&^^ave been up rooted from their home and
we trying to start over inopi^tfew home^xs^ood Chuck. Robert promise to
provide for me tol^EB^e loved me, wanted meTfr-hsvea nice car, a nice place to
live and woiiW^pfovide those things for me. He startedaBilsiagJiie only two
wee^s-after our marriage. I could no longer live in that situation and^cmiyjeft
1
5cause of his abuse.
I have interest in Advantage Property Investments.
a. Tina Simmons and John Michael Flygare
b. I am a member
d. See attached
4. This is premature since the house is not currently available for me to purchase.
5. No, Robert knew that before our first date. He told his girlfriend (Kathy) that
before he asked me to marry him. She asked him if he was sure about it since she
knew he wanted a child. He told her he was sure.
6. Yes
7. None
Requests for Production of Documents:

" ttace
Lmi(n^^^^f5^/n«
2
3. Robert has all of my records - Cost $39.00 per year and take 60 days to receive
4. Robert has all of my records
<Dwiu ^QM £00^ 6dlcPu^ojL

5.^an 0 f l „d S

7. Attached and Robert has others
8. Attached and Robert has others
9. Attached and Robert has all others
10. Attached
11. -Attaziied-ailOBberN]^^
'-fl (TKQ_
12. Robert has all of my records
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I DO NOT ADMIT TO ANY OF THE ADMMISSION
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CHASE ©

LOANOLOGY, LLC

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N A
Salt Lake City Utah 84101

GENERAL ACCOUNT
488E6400S#125
MURRAY, UT 84107-7589

PAY TO THE
ORDER OF

in
97-154/1240

4/20/2006

ADVICE OF DEPOSIT - NON-NEGOTIABLE

$

***************y

********************************************:Mr**^

DOL
Tina Simmons Pugh

MEMO:

NON-NEGOTIABLE

Pay Period: 04/01/2006 - 04/15/2006 Direct Deposit
II'OE

la^M'

i: I ai,OLU5»* Si:

&q?L i io&un'
21

LOANOLOGY, LLC
GENERAL ACCOUNT
Employee
Tina Simmons Pugh, 8346 Willow Creek Drive, Sandy, UT 84093
Earnings and Hours
Salary
Hourly Rate

Deductions From Gross
Health Insurance Emp
Taxes
Social Security Employee
Medicare Employee
Federal Withholding
UT - Withholding

c
CD

Adjustments to Net Pay
Dental "Se^cf
Child Support Garnishment

Net Pay

Qty

Rate

Current
455 00

Status (Fed/State)
Married using Single Rate/Married
Pay Period 04/01/2006 - 04/15/2006

455 00

YTD Amount
1,820 00
5,763 75
7,583 75

Current
-29 40

YTD Amount
-235 20

.Current
"-26 39
-6 17

-32 56

YTD Amount
-455 61
-106 55
-307 00
-208 46
"-1,077 62

Current
-16 28
-191 14
-207 42

YTD Amount
-130 24
-573 42
-703 66

185 62

5,567 27

Direct Deposit
*5639

Allowances/Extra
Fed-5/0/UT-5/0
Pay Date 04/20/2006
Amc
18'

Why Mark Flygare should pay attorney fees:

1. As shown Mark continued to deny phone calls and cause problems
2. As to current date since last court meeting
a. 5/9/06 called left message and only Michael, Sean and Thomas called
back
b. 5/10/06 called left message and only Natalie and Jessica called back
3. This has been going on for 5 years
4. Please review case for history of violation of court order by Mark.
Tina income is: Minimum wage at 40 hours a week.
She is current on all child support.

Department of the Treasury — Interna! Revenue Service

U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (99)

1040A
Del

Your first name and initial

2004

IRS Use Only — Do not write or staple in this .space.

Last name

OMB No 1545-O0B5
Your social security number

Instructions.)

H

Tina
the
label.
rwise,
•e print

Simmons
Last name

If a pint return, spouse's first name and initial

Spouse's social security number

Home address (number and street). If you have a P.O. box, see instructions.

Apartment no.

A
State

City, town or post office. If you have a foreign address, see instructions.

sidential
ction
npaign
instructions.)

k
~

You

Note. Checking 'Yes' will not change your tax or reduce your refund.
Do you, or your spouse if filing a joint return, want $3 to go to this fund?

If the qualifying person is a child but not your dependent,

I I Married filing jointly (even if only one had income)

enter this child's name here ••

Marriedfilingseparately. Enter spouse's SSN above and

[ j Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child

full name here •

;konly
box.

Spouse

+* f l Y e s [xJNo
flYes [~| No
[x] Head of household (with qualifying person). (See instructions.)

Single

mg
ttus

emptions

ZIP code

Important! A
You must enter your
SSN(s) above.

(see instructions)
6 a JXJ Yourself.

If someone can claim you as a dependent, do not check box Ba.

b I I Spouse

. . ..

c Dependents:
(1)

>re than six
indents,
instructions.

First name

Boxes
|— checked on
6a and 6b -

(2) Dependent's
social security
number

Last name

(3) Dependent's

relationship
to you

(4)vtf
qualifying
child for
child tax
credit

Son

John M Flygare

No. of children
on 6c w h o :
• lived
with y o u . . .
• did not
live with
you due to
divorce or
separation . •
Dependents
on 6c n o t
e n t e r e d above

Add numbers
on lines above

d Total number of exemptions claimed

some
7
ich Form(s)
; here. Also
ch Form(s)
9-Riftax
; withheld.

B a Taxable interest Attach Schedule 1 if required
*. .

b Qualified dividends (see instructions)

13

ijusted

8b

9 a Ordinary dividends. Attach Schedule 1 if required
10

lose, but
IOI attach,
payment.

6a

b Tax-exempt interest Do not include on line 8a

10

11a
12 a

11b Taxable amount

11b

12 b Taxable amount

12b

Unemployment compensation and Alaska
Permanent Fund dividends

13

14 a Social security
14b Taxable amount
benefits
14 a
15 Add lines 7 through 14b (far right column). This is your total income.
16

9a

9b

Capital gain distributions (see instructions)

11a IRA distributions
12 a Pensions and annuities
iu did not
aW-2,
instructions.

17,382,

Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Attach Form(s) W-2

Educator expenses (see instructions)

16
17

OSS

17

IRA deduction (see instructions)

come

18

Student loan interest deduction (see instructions)

15

17,382.

18

19 Tuition and fees deduction (see instructions)

19

20

Add lines 16 through 19. These are your total adjustments

21

Subtract line 20 from line 15. This is your adjusted gross income .

JK For Disclosure, Privacy Act, and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see instructions.

FDIA1312

14b

10/28/04

20
•- 21

17,382,
Form 1040A (2004)

Form 1D40A (20D4)

T i n a H Simmons
22 Enter the amount from line 21 (adjusted gross income)

Tax,
credits,
and
payments
Standard
Deduction
for• People who
checked any
box on line
23a or 23b or
who can be
claimed as a
dependent,
see
instructions.
• All others:
Single or
Marned filing
separately,
$4,850
Married filing
jointly or
Qualifying
widow(er),
$9,700
Head of
Household,
$7,150

23 a Check

rage t

0

You were born before January 2,1940,
Spouse was bom before January 2,1940,

Blind
Blind

.—M**^ •»«*
>• 23 b | j

24

Enter your standard deduction (see left margin)

24

25

Subtract line 24 from line 22. If line 24 is more than line 22, enter 0

25

7,150.
10,232.

26

If line 22 is $107,025 or less, multiply $3,100 by the total number of exemptions claimed
on line 6d. If line 22 is over $107,025, see the worksheet in the instructions
Subtract line 26 from line 25. If line 26 is more than line 25, enter -0-. This is your
taxable income
Tax, including any alternative minimum tax
(see instructions)

26

6,200.

27

4,032.

28

403.

35 Add lines 29 through 34. These are your total credits
36 Subtract line 35 from line 28. If line 35 is more than line 28, enter-0-

35

403,

37 Advance earned income credit payments from Form(s) W-2
38 Add lines 36 and 37. This is your total tax

37
38

0.

43

4,052.

44
45a

4,052.

27
28

Attach Schedule 2

29

30

Credit for the elderly or the disabled. Attach Schedule 3 . . . .

30

31

Education credits. Attach Form 8B63

32
33

Retirement savings contributions credit. Attach Form BBBO . .
Child tax credit (see instructions)

31
32
33

34

Adoption credit. Attach Form BB39

34

Federal income tax withheld from Forms W-2 and 1099 -*.. .. . * .

42

Additional child tax credit. Attach Form 8B12

43

Add hnes 39,40,41a, and 42. These are your total payments

44

If line 43 is more than line 38, subtract line 38 from line 43.
This is the amount you overpaid

403.

36

39

40 2004 estimated tax payments and amount applied from
If you have
[_
2003 return
a qualifying
41
a
Earned
Income credit (EIC)
child, attach
rSchedule EIC.
b Nontaxable combat pay election. 41 b

1,384.

40
41 a

Amount
you owe
Third party
designee
Sign
here

*" b Routing
XXXXXXXXX
number . . .
d Account
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
number . . .
46 Amount of line 44 you want applied to your 2005
estimated tax

•
c Type:

Checking

[ J Savings

46

47

Amount you owe. Subtract line 43 from line 38. For details on hDW to pay,
see instructions

48

Estimated tax penalty (see instructions)

47

48

Do you want to allow another person to discuss this return with the IRS (see instructions)?

\_j Yes. Complete the following.

JXJ Nc

Personal
identification
number(PIN)

Phone
no.

Designee's

Under penalties of penury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they
are true, correct, and accurately list all amounts and sources of income I received dunng the tax year. Declaration of preparer (other than the taxpayer) is based on all
information of which the preparer has any knowledge.
Your signature

Paid
preparer's
use only

\]

4,052.

K

I Date

Joint return?
See instructions.
Keep a copy
for your records.

2,071.
597.

42

45 a Amount of line 44 you want refunded to you
Direct deposit?
See instructions
and fill in 45b,
45c, and 45d.

••

29 Credit for child and dependent care expenses.

39

Refund

Total boxes
checked • 23 a

J

b If you are married filing separately and your spouse itemizes deductions,
see instructions and check here

1

17,382.

22

I Your occupation

I Daytime phone number

Manager
Date

Spouse's signature If a joint return, both must sign

Date

Preparer's .
signature
m>
Firm's name
(or yours If selfemployed),
address, and
ZIP code

Spouse's occupation

Check if
selfemployed

Preparer's SSN or PTIN
i—i
j

-S?2-£zPSf~£?-I'^(L
EIN
Phone
\ no
FDJA1312

10/28/04

Form 1040A (2004)

;HEDUL&

n a m e u inuuiuc U I C U H
Qualifying Child information

tit;

>rm 1040A or 1040)

2004

Complete and attach to Form 1040A or 1040
only if you have a qualifying child.
** * ' » « • * •

»artment of the Treasury
mat Revenue Service

43

,m

Your social security number

ie(s) shown on return

„xia H Simmons

ifore you begin:

See the instructions for Form 1040A, lines 41a and 41b, or Form 1040, lines 65a and
65b, to make sure that (a) you can take the EIC and (b) you have a qualifying child.

• If you take the EIC even though you are not eligible, you may not be allowed to take the credit for up to 10 years. See the
instructions for details.
dJTION: • It will take us longer to process your return and issue your refund if you do not fill in all lines that apply for each qualifying child.
• Be sure the child's name on line 1 and social security number (SSN) on line 2 agree with the child's social security card.
Otherwise, at the time we process your return, we may reduce or disallow your EIC. If the name or SSN on the child's social
security card is not correct, call the Social Security Administration at 1-800-772-1213.

jalifying Child Information
1

Child 2

Child 1

Child's name

First name

If you have more than two qualifying children, you only
have to list two to get the maximum credit
2 Child's SSN

Last name

John

First name

Last name

M Flygare

The child must have an SSN as defined in the
Form 1040A or Form 1040 instructions unless the
child was bom and died in 2004. If your child was
bom and died in 2004 and did not have an SSN,
enter 'Died' on this line and attach a copy of the
3

Year

Child's year of birth

1989

Year

If bom after 1985, skip lines 4a
and 4b; go to line 5.
4

If bom after 1985, skip lines 4a
and 4b; go to line 5.

If the child was bom before 1986 —
a Was the child under age 24 at the end of 2004 and
a student?

b Was the child permanently and totally disabled
during any part of 2004?

• Yes.

• No.

QYes.

•No.

Go to line 5.

Continue

Go to line 5.

Continue

• Yes.

QNO.

• Yes.

[]No.

Continue
5

The child is not a
qualifying child.

Continue

The child is not a
qualifying child.

Child's relationship to you
(for example, son, daughter, grandchild, niece, nephew,
Son

6

Number of months child lived with you in the United
States during 2004
•

If the child lived with you for more than half of 2004
but less than 7 months, enter T .

•

If the child was born or died in 2004 and your home
was the child's home for the entire time he or she
was alive during 2004, enter'12'

TIP

j

7_ months
Do not enter more than 12 months.

months
Do not enter more than 12 months.

You may also be able to take the additional child tax credit if your child (a) was under age 17 at the end of 2004, (b) is claimed as
your dependent on line 6c of Form 1040A or Form 1040, and (c) is a U.S. citizen or resident alien. For more details, see the
instructions for line 42 of Form 1040A or line 67 of Form 1040.

AA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see Form 1040A or 1040 instructions.

FDJA7401

11/02/04

Schedule EIC (Form 1040A or 1040) 2004

<U^036

Additional UhUd laxuredit

Form O O 1 C
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

.
(99)

2004
Attachment
Sequence No
Your social security number

Complete and attach to Form 1040 or Form 1040A.

Name(s) shown on return

-—
47

T i n a H Simmons

wm
1

AH Fliers

Enter the amount from line 1 of your Child Tax Credit Worksheet in the Form 1040 or Form 1040A
instructions. \1 you used Publication 972, enter the amount from line 8 of the worksheet on page 4
of the publication

1,000.

2

Enter the amount from Form 1040, line 51, or Form 1040A, line 33 . - .

403.

3

Subtract line 2 from line 1. If zero, stop; you cannot take this credit. . .

597.
17,382.

4 a Enter your total earned income. See the instructions
b Nontaxable combat pay included on line 4a
5

| 4b]

Is the amount on line 4a more than $10,750?
| No. Leave line 5 blank and enter -0- on line 6.

6,632,

Yes. Subtract $10,750 from the amount on line 4a Enter the result.
6

Multiply the amount on line 5 by 15% (.15) and enter the result
Next. Do you have three or more qualifying children?
|x] No.

If line 6 is zero, stop; you cannot take this credit Otherwise, skip Part II and enter the smaller of
line 3 or line 6 on line 13.

[ ] ] Yes. If line 6 is equal to or more than line 3, skip Part II and enter the amount from line 3 on line 13.
Otherwise, go to line 7.

Certain Filers Who Have Three or More Qualifying Children
7

Enter the total of the withheld social security and Medicare taxes
from Form(s) W-2, boxes 4 and 6. If married filing jointly, include
your spouse s amounts with yours, if you worked for a railroad,
see the instructions

8

1040 fliers:

Enter the total of the amounts from Form 1040,
lines 30 and 58, plus any uncollected social security
and Medicare or tier 1 RRTA taxes included on line 62.

1040A fliers:

Enter-0-.

9
10

Add lines 7 and 8
1040 filers:

Enter the total of the amounts from Form 1040, lines
55a and 66.

1040A filers:

Enter the total of the amount from Form 1040A, line 41a,
plus any excess social security and tier 1 RRTA taxes
withheld that you entered to the left of line 43
(see instructions).

10

11

Subtract line 10 from line 9. If zero or less, enter-0-

11

12

Enter the larger of line 6 or line 11 here

12

Next, enter the smaller of line 3 or line 12 on line 13.

EBBBlffl Your Additional Child Tax Credit
13

13

This is your additional child tax credit

597.

Enter this amount on
Form 1040, line 67, or
Form 1040A, line 42,
FormB812 (2004)

BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see instructions.
FD1A3001

11/09/D4

HI*

,2120

Multiple Support Declaration

OMBNo 1545-0071

December 20D2)

• Attach to Form 1040 or Form 1040A.

irtment of the Treasury
m\ Revenue Service

114
Your social security number

s(s) shown on return

na H Simmons
ing the calendar year

hn

2004

the eligible persons listed below each paid over 10% of the support of:

M

Flygare
Name of person supported

ave a signed statement from each eligible person waiving his or her right to claim this person as a dependent for any tax year that began in
\ above calendar year.
•hn

Flygare
Social security number

bie person s name

UT
ress (number, street, apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code)

ible person's name

Social secunty number

ress (number, street., apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code)

Soaal secunty number

ible person's name

Iress (number, street, apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code)

Social security number

[ible person's name

jress (number, street, apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code)

KA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see separate instructions.

FDIA29D1

Form 2120 (Rev 12-2002)

12/27/02

'IJ'-fiSi

2 0 04 COLORADO INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN SUMMARY
Taxable Income
Total Tax
Total Payments/Credits
Amount to be Refunded

$
$
$
$

4,032.00
113.00
382.00
269.00

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTRONICALLY FILING YOUR RETURN
If you are filing your return electronically, make sure you come
back to TurboTax in 24 to 48 hours to check the status of your
return. You will receive instructions at that time on how to
complete the electronic filing process. Follow those instructions.
IMPORTANT: DO NOT mail a copy of your tax return to the state
taxing authority. They already received an electronic copy of your
tax return.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAILING YOUR RETURN (NOT FOR USERS WHO FILE ELECTRONICALLY)
Your Colorado Form 104 shows a refund of $269.00.
Please mail your return to the following address by April 15, 2005*:
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
DENVER, CO 80261-0005
Be sure to sign and date your return and include the proper amount
of postage on the envelope.

Page 1

KEEP THIS PAGE FOR YOUR RECORDS - - D O NOT MAIL.

'Uft039

FORM 104
COLORADO INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN

)04

•ESIDENCY
STATUS

:HECK ONE)

(13)
,_,.
53

< )

FULL-YEAR RESIDENT(S)
tv|

EJ PART-YEAR RESIDENT(S) OR NONRESIDENT(S)
(or resident, part-year, nonresident combinations)

For calendar year 2004 or fiscal year
DECEASED

FIRST NAME AND INITIAL

LAST NAME

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

ireelf

rnmons

r>Es

Tina H

»use, If pint

FIVES
Your telephone number

State

ZIP Code

irora

tf you use a tax preparer and do not want this booklet mailed to you next year, please check here.
ROUND TO THE NEAREST DOLLAR

ENTER AMOUNT from federal Form 1040, line 42; or from federal Form 1040A, line 27; or from federal
Form 1040EZ, line 6; or from the federal TeleFile worksheet, line K (Federal Taxable income)

1

4 , 0 3 2 . |00

2

00

DDITIONS TO FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME
Enter the amount of the state income tax deduction, if any, you claimed on Schedule A of your
federal Form 1040, line 5
.

. . . . »
•

Other additions, explain
Total of lines 1 through 3

3
4

4,032.

JBTRACTIONS FROM FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME
I

Enter the amount of state income tax refund, if any, you reported on line 10
of your federal Form 1040

•

i

United States government interest

•

6

'

Pension-annuity subtraction, taxpayer

•

7
8

l

Pension-annuity subtraction, spouse

•

I

Colorado source capital gain (see FY! income 15)

•

9

I

Tuition program contribution

•

10

•

!

Other subtractions, explain:

I

Total of lines 5 through 11

\

COLORADO TAXABLE INCOME, line 4 minus line 12

00

5

11
12

*

13

4,032.

GO TO THE TAX TABLE IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WITH YOUR TAXABLE INCOME FROM LINE 13 TO FIND YOUR TAX.
PART-YEAR RESIDENTS AND NONRESIDENTS GO TO FORM 104PN. FULL-YEAR RESIDENTS ENTER YOUR TAX ON LINE 14.

INCOME TAX AND CREDITS
14

(only if
Colorado

tax
withheld is
reported

on the
form)

COLORADO TAX from the tax table.
Part-year residents and nonresidents enter tax from line 36, Form 104PN

20

Gross conservation easement credit from line 33, Form 104 CR

•

20

21

Enterprise zone credits from line 43, Form 104 CR

•

21

113, 00
£0
9SL
113, 0£
0. 0£
£2.
oo
00

22
23

00
1 1 3 . 00

•

14

15 Alternative minimum tax from Form 104AMT

•

15

1S Recapture of prior year credits

•

16

Personal credits from line 29, Form 104 CR

•

18

19 Alternative fuel credits from line 32, Form 104 CR

•

19

17 Total of iines 14 through 16
18

17

22 Total of lines 18 through 21 (if more than the total of iines 14 and 15,
see line 22 instructions)
23 Net tax, line 17 minus line 22

COIA0212

. .

11/15/04

<l^040

1UJU

H Simmons
24 Enter the amount from federal f orm 1040, line 36; or from federal form 1040A, line 21;
or from federal form 1040EZ, li ne 4; or from the federal TeleFile worksheet, line I
(Federal Adjusted Gross Income)
25 Amount from line 23 on page 1 of form (Net Tax)

Tina

26

COLORADO INCOME TAX WITHHELD from wageis and winnings

27

ESTIMATED TAX payments and credits; extensio n payments; and amounts withheld
on nonresident real estate sales and partnership/S c:orp/fiduciary income

28

Child care credit from line 5, Form104CR

434 - 5 1 - 6 2 5 6

24

Page2

1 7 , 3 8 2 . 00
1 1 3 . ool

. .
. •

25
26

•

27

00

•

28

00

3 8 2 . 00

R

£
R
E

E

F

y

c
D

D D
M A
'
T

*

B

N ?

s

rE

.

29

Total of lines 26 through 28 .

30

If line 29 is more than line 25, subtract line 25 from line 29.
This is your overpayment
Amount you want credited to your 2005 estimated teIX

31

.

29

382.

ool

3D

2 6 9 . 00

•

31

0.

orjl

ENTER THE AMOUNT, IF ANY, YOU WISH T O CONTRIBUTE TO:
c
V
0
L
U
N
T
A
R
Y

C
0
N
T
R
1

H
E
C
K
0
F
F

B

U
J
1
0
N
S

C
0
L
0
R
A
0

32

The Colorado Nongame and Endanaered Wildlife Ftj n d

•

32

33

The Colorado Domestic Abuse Fund

.

•

33

ruH

34

The Colorado Homeless Preverition Activities Fund

.

•

34

o"o|
POM

35

The Special Olympics Colorado Fund

36

The Western Colorado State Vesterans Cemetery Fund

00

•

35

.

•

36

ool

.

.

37

00|
00

The Court-Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) Fund

.

•

38

39

The Colorado Watershed Prote

.

•

39

oTTl

40

The Family Resource Centers F

.

•

40

nn

41

The Colorado State Fair Authon

.

•

41

00 ,

42

The Organ and Tissue Donation Awareness Fund .

.

•

42

38

43
44

Direct
Deposit

E
F

u

N
ID

.

Line 30 minus line 43. This is your REFUND
•

Routing number

124002971

Account number

3651008835

Type:

_
|Xj Checking

•

0.

44

oo!
00 I

2 6 9 . 00 |

_
|_J Savings

AMOUNT YOU OWE

UM

,

•

45

00

46

interest, also include on line 48

.

•

46

00

47

Estimated tax penalty, also inciu

.

•

47

00

48

if line 25 is more than line 29, subtract line 29 from line 25. This is the
amount you owe. Include amounts entered as voluntary contributions on lines

.

•

48

nn

o
N
T

|o
W

•

0

•
.

If your check is rejected due to
insufficient or uncollected funds, the
To ensure you receive credit for your payment, write your social security number Department of Revenue may collect
and 'Form 104' on your check.
the payment amount directly from
y0Ur bankirvg acC0Unt B
DO NOT send cash; DO NOT staple check to return.
'«*™ically.
Under penalties of perjury, 1 declare that to the best of my knowledge and belief, this return is true, correct,
and complete.

s
NT E
o *

MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.

Spouse's Signature, If joint return, BOTH must sign.

Your Signature

Year of Birth

Date

Year of Birth

Date

R

1967
Paid Preparer's Name, Address and Telephone Number

Self

MAIL YOUR RETURN TO:

prepared

cOLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE DENVER,
CO 80261-0005
FILE ELECTRONICALLY FOR A FASTER REFUND (SEE INSTRUCTIONS)

COIA0212
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2004

DRWI104PN - PART-YEAR RESIL^rtJT/NONRESIDENT TAX CALCULATION SCHEDULE
Attach this form to your completed income tax return Form 104
Sopa! Security Number

axpayer's Name

i n a H Simmons
ise this form if you and/or your spouse were a resident of another state for all or part of 2004. This form apportions your gross income so the
-olorado tax computed from the tax table on your total 2004 income will be reduced to reflect only your Colorado income. This form should be
smpieted after you have filled out lines 1 through 13 of Form 104. If you filed federal forms 1040NR or Telefiled your federal return, see FYI
icome 6.
Full-Year Nonresident;

Part-Year Resident from

Full-Year Nonresident;

Part-Year Resident from

1
2

Taxpayer is (check one):
Spouse is (check one):

3

Check the federal form you filed.
1040
PC 1040A

4

1040 EZ

Telefiie

1040 NR

Other

0 9 / 1 5 / 0 4 to
/ 0 4 to

1 2 / 3 1 /04
/04

Federal
information
1 7 , 3 8 2 . [00

Enter all income from Form 1040 line 7; 1040A line 7; or Form 1040E2 line 1 .

Enter income from line 6 that was earned while you were a resident of Colorado

8

Enter all income from Form 1040 line 19; Form 1040A line 13; or Form
1040EZIine3

9

1 0 , 4 8 5 . 00

Enter all interest/dividend income from Form 1040 lines Ba and 9a; Form
1040A lines 8a and 9a; or Form 1040E2line2
,

7

Full-Year Resident

Colorado
Information

Enter income from line 4 that was earned while working in Colorado and/or
earned while you were a Colorado resident. Part-year residents should include
moving expense reimbursements only if paid for moving into Colorado
6

Full-Year Resident

00
00
00

Enter income from line 8 that is from State of Colorado unemployment
benefits; and/or is from another state's benefits that were received while
you were a Colorado resident

00

/ou filed federal Form 1040EZ, go to line 24. All others continue with line 10.
0

Enter all income from Form 1040 lines 13 and 14; or Form 1040A line 10

1

Enter income from line 10 that was earned during that part of the year you were
a Colorado resident and/or was earned on property located in Colorado

2
3

Enter all income from Form 1040 lines 15b, 16b, and 20b; or Form 1040A
lines 11b, 12b, and 14b

10

00
11

12

Enter income from line 12 that was received during that part of the year you
were a Colorado resident

00

00
13

00

fou filed federal Form 1040A, go to line 20. If you filed Form 1040, continue with line 14.
4

Enter all business and farm income from Form 1040 lines 12 and 18

14

5

Enter income from line 14 that was earned during that part of the year you were
a Colorado resident and/or was earned from a Colorado operation

6

Enteral! Schedule E income from Form 1040 line 17

7

Enter income from line 16 that was earned from Colorado sources; and/or rent
and royalty income received or credited to your account during that part of the
year you were a Colorado resident; and/or partnership/S corporation/fiduciary
income apportioned based on the number of days of Colorado residency during
the corporation/partnership/fiductary tax year

B

00
15

16

00

00

17

00

Enter all other income from Form 1040 lines 10, 11 and 21,
(list type

18

Enter income from line 18 that was earned or received during that part of the
year you were a Colorado resident and/or was received from Colorado sources

00
19

00

(list type

COIA0712

11/12/04
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Colorado
Information

Federal
Information
20

Total Income. Enter amount from Form 1040 line 22; or Form 1040A line 15

21

Total Colorado Income. Enter the total from the Colorado column, lines 5, 7, 9,
11, 13,15, 17 and 19

22

1 7 , 3 8 2 . |00
21

1 0 , 4 6 5 . [00

Enter al! federal adjustments from Form 1040 line 35, or Form 1040A line 20
(list type

23

20

22

) .

00

Enter adjustments from line 22 as follows:
(list type

23

)

00

• The IRA deduction, educator expenses, business expenses of reservist,
performing artist and fee-basis government officials, health savings account
deduction, self-employment tax, self-employed health insurance deduction,
SEP and SIMPLE deductions are allowed in the ratio of Colorado wages and
self-employment income to total wages and self-employment income.
• The student loan interest deduction, alimony, and tuition and fees deduction
are allowed in the Colorado to federal total income ratio (line 21/line 20)
• Penalty paid on early withdrawals made while a Colorado resident
• Moving expenses if you are moving into Colorado, not if you are moving out.
• For treatment of other adjustments reported on form 1040 line 35, see FYI income 6.
24

25

Adjusted Gross Income. Enter amount from Form 1040 line 3B; or Form
1040A line 21; or Form 1040E2 line 4

24

Colorado Adjusted Gross Income. If you filed Form 1040 or 1040A, subtract the
amount on line 23 of Form 104PN from the amount on line 21 of Form 104PN. If you filed Form 1040EZ,
enter the total of lines 5, 7 and 9 of Form 104PN

26

Additions to Adjusted Gross income. Enter the amount from line 3 of
Colorado Form 104 excluding any charitable contribution adjustments

27

Additions to Colorado Adjusted Gross income. Enter any amount from line 26
that is from non-Colorado state or local bond interest earned while a Colorado
resident, and/or any lump-sum distribution from a pension or profit sharing plan
received while a Colorado resident. (See FYI income 5 for treatment of other additions).
28

25

27

17,382.

Total of lines 25 and 27.

30

Subtractions from Adjusted Gross Income. Enter the amount from line 12 of
Colorado Form 104

00

00

29

29

1 0 , 4 8 5 . 00

00

26

ZB Total of lines 24 and 26

31

1 7 , 3 8 2 . (00

10,485.

00

00

30

Subtractions from Colorado Adjusted Gross Income. Enter any amount from
line 30 as follows:
• The state income tax refund subtraction to the extent included on line 19 above,

31

00

• The federal interest subtraction to the extent included on line 7 above,
• The pension/annuity subtraction and the PERA or School District Number One
retirement subtraction to the extent included on line 13 above,
• The Colorado capital gain subtraction to the extent included on line 11 above,
• For treatment of other subtractions, see FYI income 6.
32
33

Modified Adjusted Gross Income. Subtract the amount on line 30 from the
amount on line 28

32

17,382.

00

Modified Colorado Adjusted Gross Income. Subtract the amount on line 31
from the amount on line 29

33

1 0 , 4 8 5 . 00

34

Amount on line 33 divided by the amount on line 32

34

60.3210

35

Tax from the tax table based on income reported on Colorado Form 104 line 13

35

1 8 8 . 00

35

Apportioned tax. Amount on line 35 multiplied by the percentage on iine 34.
Enter here and on Form 104 line 14

35

1 1 3 . 00

COIA0712
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,Bar#
Attorney for
Address
Telephone

In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH

:

Financial Declaration

:

Civil No.
Judge
Commissioner

)?ttihontr,
vs.

:
Respondent.

Occupation' . A^&l^4-ary+
Employer:
j^nn mo log a
Employer Address. W^S g . ^r^oa> S
^Jo^
fajLJcrra i UT
&£JCT?
Number of exemptions claimea
^
Birthdate•
V J M »
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS & LIABILITIES
1.

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME from'
Salary and wages, including commissions,
bonuses, overtime and allowances)
Pensions and retirement
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment,
Child support from any prior marriage

n
etc.)

q_
A

-1-

MJ'"044

Dividends and interest
Rents
All other sources (Specify)
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME
MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
Federal income tax
State income tax
FICA .
Health insurance
Life insurance
Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund

A

c5
~6

S Aait>
$

0
JO.

^S-&2>
£o-

<fr<3

401(k)

Savings plan
Credit union
Other (specify) CM Id S ^ p ^ ^ y d ^ A ^ ^ A ^ J . ^ ) %-Q
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS $ f? y. *&
NET MONTHLY INCOME (Attach WTD
pay stub and pnor year W-2/tax return)
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Purpose
Creditor's Name
of debt

7a

cs~xj

4

In whose
name

Balance

Monthly
Paymeni
&?•>

->&>&

/

j^yi^i^^-

J-U3JX-

&

^niod/rd>Jp /H-'JJ<

2£> ,

Of

JirOL

0

TOTAL
-2-

>U$045

PROPERTY
(a) Real estate (if more than one parcel of real estate, attach sheet with
identical information)
Address
_
Date of acquisition.
Original cost $
Mortgage balance $_
Mortgage holder
Monthly payment $_
Other liens $
Lienholder
Monthly payment $_
Current value $
Basis of valuation

(b)

Vehicles (Year, make & model)

<3AAft

(c)
Name of
institution

A/A

<iG

9ooJ

Value

Balance
owed

%^8^

$ 3$<3<y

i

Cash and deposit accounts (banks, savmgs &
loans, credit unions-savings and checking)
^

Account No.

Current
balance
\%

-3-

'UH048

(d)

Securities, stocks, bonds, money
market funds (other)

Name of
institution

Account No

Current
value
S

'e)

Busmess interests

Name of
busmess

Shares
j^^/gkS?^

Current
value

jj&>

u

(f)

Other assets (include value or equity)

PROFIT SHARING OR RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS sO^])
(If more than two accounts, attach sheet with identical information)
Name of company/plan name
Plan representative
Address
.
Current value

-4-

'U

Name of company^
Plan representative,.
Address
Current value
LIFE INSURANCE
Name of Company

Policy
No

' Face
Amount
1

Cash Value (if any)
—4>

MONTHLY EXPENSES
Rent or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property msnrance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies

$ tTpb€rj

"

JS

cT&

*y*A
6>4°

Utilities'

Electricity
Natural gas
Water
Sewer
Garbage
Telephone
Laundry and dry cleaning
Clothing
Medical
Dental

fS

<=*Z3

s&& > <*r>
£&•
, <£><2»

Xo

• & O

/> - &&

%^>

&>

£o*

<=fe>

^

/to?dJ? •

- <=£>

^

AUOt
^

vJ r

Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive
liability, disability: excluding deductions
from wages m item 2 above)
Child care
Payment of child support or alimony
from pnor marriage
School
Entertainment
Gifts
Donations
Travel
Auto expense
3 ^ 7 yJfag&Ja*^
Auto payments
Installment payments (from item 4 above,
not including above)
Other expenses (specify)

.^r~
J>

- 3XZ-

V9M

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES

.DO "a s
>

Or

S^C?' o£>

/%£<

$r

<sz>

/72 z^

STATE OF UTAH)
ss.
County of Salt Lake)
I swear under penalty of perjury that all of tjie information contained herein is
true and correct.
^

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
•ji^^^U^^'

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

G-L-0 "
Notary Public
GLORIA NEMELKA

6806S1300 E

(Rev. 3/01)

Salt Lake City, UT S4121
My Oommis&lon Expires
June 06,2009
State of Utah

6-

uj-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on

,20
in case #

postage prepaid to;

By the undersigned:

, a true and correct copy of
was mailed,

LOANOLOGY, LLi

JPMorgan Chase Bank, H.i
Sail Lake Dry Utah B4101

GENERAL ACCOUNT
488 E 6400S#125
MURRAY, UT 84107-7589

PAY TO THE
ORDER OF

4/20/2006

ADVICE OF DEPOSIT - NON-NEGOTIABLE

$

* * * * • * * • * * * • * • * • * * * • • * • • * • * *

* * * • * • *

•****************^******************^^

DOLLARS
Tina Simmons Pugh

NON-NEGOTIABLE

MEMO: Pay Period: 04/01/2006 - 04/15/2006 Direct Deposit

ii-0 S L E =3*««* i: IE 1*00 1 5 i . 5 i :

& 1 7 1 * 1 1 0 &ii «•

21294

LOANOLOGY, LLC
GENERAL ACCOUNT
Employee
Tina Simmons Pugh, 8346 Willow Creek Drive, Sandy, UT 84093
Earnings and Hours
Salary
Hourly Rate

Qty

Rate

Current
455.00
455 00

Deductions From Gross
Health Insurance Emp

Current

Taxes
Social Security Employee
Medicare Employee
Federal Withholding
UT - Withholding

Current
-26 39
-6 17

Adjustments to Net Pay
Dental Select
Child Support Garnishment

Net Pay

-29 40

Status (Fed/State)
Married using Single Rate/Married
Pay Period 04/01/2006-04/15/2006
YTD Amount
1,820 00
5,763 75
7,583 75

Direct Deposit
Checking - *****5639

Allowances/Extra
Fed-5/0/UT-5/0
Pay Date 04/20/2006
Amount

185 62

YTD Amount
-235.20

-32 56

YTD Amount
-455 61
-106.55
-307 00
-208 46
-1,077 62

Current
-16.28
-191 14
-207 42

YTD Amount
-130.24
-573 42
-703.66

185 62

5,567.27

LOANOLOGY, LLC , 488 E 6400 S , Ste #125, Murray, UT 84107 (801) 506-2250

-Hi'.f,5

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case
on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references, (a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and
with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references
to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court, or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the
appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall
be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature
of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported
by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which
the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall
contain a copy of:

(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not
available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of
the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee,
and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to
the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.
The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs
(a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with
leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations
as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,1 "the taxpayer,"
etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume
as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the
transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not
exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a)
of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth
the length of briefs.

(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in
combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues
raised in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and
present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and
Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to
the Brief of CrossAppellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall
reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court
for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds
the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be
briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause.for
granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is
due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by a
copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is
due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy
of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any
responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief
will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving
more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes
of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant
or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may
similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities
come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine
copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the
letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter
must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in

<iK»G54

compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer
v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate.
'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)).
See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732,
738-39 (Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the
applicable standard of review and citation of supporting authority.
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LEXSEE 140 P.3D 1200

©
Cited
As of: Oct 01, 2008
United Park City Mines Co., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, v.
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, a Netherlands association; Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, a general partnership; Stichting Mayflower Recreation;
Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc., a Utah corporation; Royal Street of Utah; Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisenboerenleenbank, B.A., a Netherlands corporation; May
Finance C.V.; Deer Valley Resort, Inc., a Nevada corporation; and Newpark Resources, Inc., a Nevada corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 20040943
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2006 UT35; 140 PJd 1200; 553 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 2006 Utah LEXIS 129

June 6,2006, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Publication September 5,2006.

[***1] Released for
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CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee mine company
filed a complaint seeking partition of certain property. As
part of the partition process, the Fourth District, Heber
Department, Utah, appointed three referees to investigate
the issues relevant to the partition and to produce a report. The trial court partitioned the property located in
two counties, and it entered an accompanying award of
owelty. Appellant tenant-in-common challenged the partition.
OVERVIEW: The mine company sought annexation of
1340 acres of land for development purposes. The mine
company and the tenant-in-common owned approximately 342 acres of property. The partition property was
comprised of certain patented mining claims. The tenantin-common contended the mine company waived its
right to partition, and it was therefore error for the trial
court to order the partition. Alternatively, the tenant-incommon argued that the trial court erred in its calculation
of the owelty award and its refusal to order an account-

ing. The appellate court determined that the accounting
issue was duplicative of the owelty claim; therefore, it
focused on the partition issue. The appellate court rejected the tenant-in-common's challenge to the trial
court's ruling because the tenant-in-common had failed to
marshal the evidence as required by Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). What was presented to the appellate court was
merely another argument of the case presented in the trial
court. As a result, the appellate court assumed that the
evidence supported the factual findings underlying the
ruling.
OUTCOME: The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's judgment.
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[HN1 ] Whether a party has effectuated a waiver of partition is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether a trial
court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the
actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual
in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations. An appellate court grants broadened discretion to a
trial court's findings when reviewing questions of waiver.

tion; they must play the devil's advocate. In so doing,
parties must present the evidence in a light most favorable to a trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case. In sum, to properly marshal the evidence, a challenging party must
demonstrate how a court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the
clear weight of the evidence.
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Demurrers, & Objections > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses,
Demurrers, & Objections > Waiver &. Preservation
[HN2] A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. Questions of
waiver often hinge on the critical third element of intent.
An appellate court has explained that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct and that fact-finders should
look at the totality of the circumstances in discerning
intent.
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[HN6] An appellate court has repeatedly warned of the
grim consequences parties face when ihey fail to fulfill
the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to perform
this critical task, an appellate court car rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of fact.
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[HN4] To pass the threshold of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9),
parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to
a lower court. That waiver is a mixed question of law
and fact does not relieve a party of this important task.
Even where appellants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, if a determination of the correctness of a
court's application of a legal standard is extremely factsensitive, parties also have a duty to marshal the evidence.
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[HNS] Parties are required to temporarily remove their
own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's posi-
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[HN7] The owelty remedy, though enabled by statute,
Utah Code Ann § 78-39-41 (2002), is an equitable form
of relief. The statute itself recognizes the equitable nature
of owelty: it empowers courts to make compensatory
adjustment among the parties according to the principles
of equity. This is consistent with the characterization of
partition, which an appellate court has held to be an equitable action, in part because the fundamental objective
in a partition action is to divide the property so as to be
fair and equitable and confer no unfair advantage on any
of the co-tenants.
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[HN9] The equitable distribution of property involves
more than factual findings and legal conclusions: it requires trial courts to balance the relative significance of
the facts and applicable law in order to achieve a fair and
equitable result. This balancing requires the exercise of
discretion. In partition actions, trial courts are specifically accorded broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate decree. An appellate court will affirm a trial court's
exercise of that broad discretion unless it was abused.

sion depended. This requires that parties marshal the
evidence. Parties who ask an appellate court to consider
fact-sensitive questions—including those questions reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard-have a
duty to marshal all the evidence that formed the basis for
a trial court's ruling.
COUNSEL: Laura S. Scott, Michael P. Petrogeorge,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for appellants.
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[HN10] Owelty is a remedy sometimes awarded in conjunction with a partition order. When a partition cannot
be made without great prejudice to a cotenant, a trial
court, by statute, is permitted to order a sale of the property. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-1 (2002). Owelty is an
equitable alternative to this often undesirable result. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41, a court can go forward
with the partition and award owelty to a prejudiced party
in order to compensate for any inequality suffered by that
party. In the past, an appellate court has expressed a
preference that trial courts award owelty rather than
forcing a sale. An appellate court reemphasizes this preference: a public sale should be a last resort, especially in
cases where both parties desire to retain an interest in the
property to be partitioned.
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[HN11] Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41, a trial
court is required to determine whether a partition could
be made equally among the parties without prejudice to
the rights and interests of another party. This is clearly a
question of fact.
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[HN12] When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive use
of its discretionary powers, they must successfully challenge the factual findings upon which a trial court's deci-
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Judge Quinn concur in Justice Parrish's opinion. Having
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herein; District Court Judge Anthony B. Quinn sat.
OPINION BY: PARRISH
OPINION
[**1202] PARRISH, Justice:
[*P1] This case stems from the application of a
much-favored property right: a cotenant's right to partition. Partition is intended to broker peace between feuding cotenants and promote the productive use of property. The scarcity of relevant case law is perhaps a reflection of the effectiveness and wisdom of the remedy.
Nevertheless, a judicial partition [**1203] can sometimes breed further contention and dissatisfaction.
[***2] This is one such case.
[*P2] Appellants Stichting Mayflower Mountain
Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds
(collectively, "Mayflower") challenge the trial court's
partition of certain property located in Summit and Wasatch Counties and an accompanying award of owelty.
Mayflower contends that appellee United Park City
Mines Company ("United Park") waived its right to partition and that it was therefore error for the trial court to
order the partition. Alternatively, Mayflower argues that
the trial court erred in its calculation of the owelty award
and its refusal to order an accounting.
[*P3] We reject Mayflower's challenge to the trial
court's ruling because Mayflower has failed to marshal
the evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, we assume
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that the evidence supports the factual findings underlying
the ruling. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
A. The Properties
[*P4] United Park and Mayflower own approximately 342 acres of property (the "Partition Property") as
tenants in common. The Partition Property is comprised
of certain patented mining claims located in the Uintah
[***3] Mining District. Approximately 216 acres of the
Partition Property lie in Summit County; the remaining
acres are located in Wasatch County. The Partition Property is located in an area commonly known as "Upper
Mountain."
[*P5] Additionally, United Park and Mayflower
each separately own nearby properties. United Park owns
approximately 1400 acres of property located in Summit
County (the "United Park Property"). Part of the United
Park Property is an 84-acre parcel termed "Mountain
Village," which is located in an area commonly known
as "Lower Mountain." Another part of the United Park
Property is a portion of the "Northside Neighborhood," a
planned 63-acre development in Upper Mountain. United
Park and Deer Valley Resort Company ("Deer Valley")
are the two main Northside Neighborhood property owners; three others also own interests in the Northside
Neighborhood, including Mayflower. Mayflower solely
owns approximately 50 to 60 acres of Summit County
property (the "Mayflower Property").
B. The Annexation and Development Agreement
[*P6] United Park has long sought to develop the
United Park Property. But Summit County zoning regulations, which permitted only one unit [***4] of development per 40 acres, prevented large-scale development.
In 1994, United Park petitioned Park City for annexation
of approximately 1340 acres of land located in Summit
County, seeking a regulatory framework more conducive
to its development goals. Thus began a long and difficult
negotiation process that ultimately culminated in United
Park's partition petition.
[*P7] Park City allegedly responded to United
Park's 1994 petition by insisting on two conditions to
annexation: (1) that the annexation extend to the Summit
County line and cover property owned by several different owners, including the United Park Property, the Mayflower Property, and the portion of the Partition Property
lying within Summit County (collectively, the "Flagstaff
Development"); and (2) that the Flagstaff Development
be subject to a master development agreement (the "De-

velopment Agreement") regulating its use and development. United Park continued negotiating with Park City
for over four years. United Park and Park City particularly struggled over how much development density to
allocate to the Mountain Village and Northside Neighborhood developments. None of the other property owners ever participated [***5] in the negotiation process,
nor did they bear the associated expenses.
[*P8] In 1997, the Park City planning commission
approved United Park's proposal, which called for development in both the Upper Mountain and Lower Mountain areas. The city council, however., rejected the proposal and passed a resolution restricting development to
Lower Mountain. Frustrated, [**1204] United Park
initiated parallel negotiations with Summit County for a
deal that would amend that County's restrictive zoning
regulations. Park City resumed negotiations with United
Park shortly thereafter, and in 1998, the city council
passed a resolution allowing for development on Upper
Mountain. The annexation and the Development Agreement were both finalized on June 24, 1999.
[*P9] The Development Agreement permits 470
residences, 16 single-family lots, and commercial development in Mountain Village. The Development Agreement also allows for the development of up to 38 singlefamily lots in the Northside Neighborhood. Under the
Development Agreement, United Park and Deer Valley
are collectively entitled to 30 lots in the Northside
Neighborhood. The Development Agreement also
authorizes 8 additional Northside Neighborhood [***6]
lots (the "Conditional Lots"), but only in the event that
the other three property owners, including Mayflower,
elect to join in the Development Agreement. According
to the Development Agreement, all development is to
take place within discrete "development pods"; the majority of the Flagstaff Development—approximately 1500
acres-is zoned as "recreational open space."
[*P10] Approximately 3.5 acres of the Partition
Property (the "Adjacent Property") are located adjacent
to both the proposed subdivision within the Northside
Neighborhood and the Mayflower Property. The Mayflower Property is also located adjacent to the proposed
subdivision within the Northside Neighborhood. The
portion of the Partition Property located in Wasatch
County was not annexed and is not subject to the Development Agreement.
[*P11] United Park made significant concessions
as part of the Development Agreement. In exchange for
enhanced development rights in the United Park Property
and the Northside Neighborhood, United Park agreed not
to develop (1) an approximately 650-acre parcel in
Summit County commonly known as "Richardson Flats";
(2) an approximately 90-acre parcel located at the top of
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Iron [***7] Mountain; and (3) a parcel commonly
known as "Prospect Ridge." United Park also agreed to
"offer to dedicate to the City a conservation easement[]
or deed" in order to preserve several parking lots located
near City Hall. United Park was also forced to "ratchet
down its proposed density" for its development of an
approximately 1500-acre parcel in Wasatch County
commonly known as "Bonanza Flats." Additionally,
United Park committed to operating private shuttle services within Mountain Village, as well as undertaking
multi-million dollar road construction and renovation
projects. As part of the Development Agreement, Park
City acquired a conservation easement over 1,000-plus
acres of property owned solely by United Park. United
Park also agreed to either construct a gondola between
the Flagstaff Mountain Resort and old town Park City or,
if Park City demanded, pay one million dollars to Park
City.
C. The United Park-Mayflower Relationship
[*P12] Throughout its negotiations with Park City,
United Park attempted to get Mayflower and the other
Flagstaff Development property owners to participate in
a joint venture. These efforts ultimately were unsuccessful. On February 25, 1997, Hank [***8] Rothwell, the
president of United Park, faxed a letter (the "1997 Letter") to Mayflower stating, "United Park or its representatives, will not annex [Mayflower's] property or accept a
density approval for [Mayflower's] property without
[Mayflower's] notification and permission." The 1997
Letter was purportedly "reconfirmed" on March 20,
1997. Discussions between United Park and Mayflower
continued, and on September 3, 1998, Mayflower advised Park City in writing that it objected to the terms of
the annexation. United Park grew increasingly frustrated
by Mayflower's refusal to participate in any kind of joint
venture, and on January 21, 1999, Rothwell sent a letter
to Mayflower advising that United Park would "delete
Mayflower property from [the] Master Planning effort."
[*P13] The annexation was finalized on June 24,
1999, pursuant to Park City Ordinance No. 99-30. Although unilateral, the annexation petition was proper
under Utah Code section J 0-2-403(2) (b) (1999), which
requires [**1205] that a petition be signed by the owner
or owners of "a majority of the private land area within
the area proposed for annexation" that is "equal in value
to at least 1/3 of the value of all private [***9] real
property within the area proposed for annexation." Because United Park was the undisputed majority property
owner, its petition met these requirements.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[*P14] In February 2000, United Park filed a complaint seeking partition of the Partition Property. As part

of the partition process, the trial court appointed three
referees to investigate the issues relevant to the partition
and to produce a report recommending how the Partition
Property should be divided. Each party chose one referee; those two referees in turn selected a third neutral
referee.
[*P15] Over the course of several months, the referees reviewed the history of the annexation process and
the resulting Development Agreement. The referees first
focused their efforts on deciding how best to physically
divide the Partition Property; they then investigated
Mayflower's claims that the Development Agreement
had resulted in a transfer of development density from
the Partition Property and the Mayflower Property to
Mountain Village and the Northside Neighborhood. The
referees submitted their reports in April 2001. The neutral referee and the United Park referee signed the majority conclusions [***10] and recommendations (the
"Majority Report"), while the Mayflower referee submitted a separate, dissenting report (the "Minority Report").
[*P16] The Majority Report recommended that the
Partition Property be divided so that United Park and
Mayflower each receive approximately 108 acres in
Summit County and roughly 63 acres in Wasatch
County. Additionally, the Majority Report proposed that
Mayflower be granted the Adjacent Property as part of
its 108-acre Summit County allotment. The Majority
Report further recommended that the trial court award
Mayflower 3 or 4 of the Conditional Lots. According to
the Majority Report, this award would compensate Mayflower for density that was "probably relocated from the
[Partition Property and the Mayflower Property] and
clustered into the Northside Neighborhood." In making
this recommendation, the authors of the Majority Report
stated that they were "convinced that the density in the
Flagstaff Development gained from the [Partition Property] and from [the Mayflower Property] is limited to
Mayflower's fair portion of the [Conditional Lots] in the
Northside Neighborhood."
[*P17] The Minority Report did not dispute the
Majority [***11] Report's proposed physical partition of
the Partition Property. It disagreed with the Majority
Report, however, as to how many of the Conditional Lots
Mayflower should be awarded. The Minority Report
found that density may have been transferred to Mountain Village from the Partition Property. According to the
Minority Report's calculations, Mayflower was possibly
entitled to a total of 7.85 to 8.1 lots.
[*P18] In March 2002, Mayflower amended its answer in the partition lawsuit to allege that United Park,
through the 1997 Letter, had waived its right to partition
the Partition Property. Both parties filed unsuccessful
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summary judgment motions in late 2002. In May 2004,
the court held a bench trial and subsequently issued a
ruling adopting the recommendations of the Majority
Report. The trial court issued amended findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order in October 2004, and
Mayflower timely appealed. This court initially transferred the appeal to the court of appeals but subsequently
vacated the transfer order and recalled the case. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (j)
(2002).
ANALYSIS
[*P19] Our holding in this case is but the [***12]
latest in a series of warning signs we must occasionally
post for unsuspecting or overly clever parties. The following analysis should serve as frank, severe instruction
for those parties who ask us to decide fact-dependent
questions under the guise that they present only issues of
law.
[*P20] While Mayflower purports to raise a multitude of issues in its briefs, the substance [**1206] of
this case can actually be distilled into two discrete questions: (1) whether the trial court erred in determining that
United Park did not waive its right to partition; and (2)
whether the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning
the owelty award. Mayflower also requests an accounting. Because we conclude that Mayflower's claim for an
accounting is duplicative of its request for an additional
owelty award, we refuse to consider that claim. We
therefore focus on the questions of waiver and owelty
and discuss each in turn.
I. WAIVER
[*P21] [HN1] Whether a party has effectuated a
waiver is a mixed question of law and fact. Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P 23, 100 P.3d 1177; see also
[***13] US.Realty 86 Assocs. v. Sea lnv., Ltd, 2002
UT 14, P 11,40 P. 3d 586. As we explained in Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, P 16, 982 P.2d 572, "[W]hether
the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver
presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting
waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as
factual determinations." Accordingly, we "grant broadened discretion to the trial court's findings" when reviewing questions of waiver. Chen, 2004 UT 82, P 23,

100P.3dll77.
[*P22] We have repeatedly applied the rule clarified in Soterfs, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993), when evaluating
questions of waiver. [HN2] "A waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver,
there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish

it." Id (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re
Flake, 2003 UT 17, P 30, 71 P. 3d 589. Questions of
waiver often hinge on the critical third element of intent.
We have explained that the intent to relinquish a right
must be [***14] distinct and that fact-finders should
u
look[] at the totality of the circumstances" in discerning
intent. Id.
[*P23] Mayflower argues that United Park waived
its right to seek a partition of the property. And there is
no dispute that the first two elements of waiver were
satisfied here: United Park had the right to a partition and
was aware of that right. Accordingly, the existence of a
waiver turns on the question of intent. On this point, the
trial court found that "United Park hafd] not waived its
right to partition[;] [t]he [1997 Letter] . . . did not evidence an intent by United Park to waive its right to partition." Because the issue of intent is determinative here,
Mayflower must successfully challenge this factual
finding if we are to reverse the trial court's ruling. This
requires that Mayflower marshal all the evidence supporting that finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Because
Mayflower has failed to do so, we assume that the evidence supports the finding and consequently affirm.
[*P24] Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires [HN3] "[a] party challenging a
fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that
supports the [***15] challenged finding." See also State
v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, P 17, 124 P.3d 235; Wilson Supply, Inc. v Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 21, 54
P.3d 1177. [HN4] To pass this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the evidence in
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court
below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, P 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
[*P25] That waiver is a mixed question of law and
fact does not relieve Mayflower of this important task.
"Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the
legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness
of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely
fact-sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty to marshal the evidence." Chen, 2004 UT 82, P 20, 100 P.3d
1177. Mayflower cannot dodge this duty by attempting
to frame the issues as legal ones. Because the question of
waiver is so dependent on factual findings, Mayflower
must marshal the evidence if it seeks to challenge the
trial court's determination of that question.
[***16] [**1207] [*P26] Mayflower has not
done so. It ostensibly makes an effort to marshal the evidence on pages 21-22 of its brief: "It marshals the evidence . . . to present the [1997 Letter] and testimony [of
one witness]." But contrary to Mayflower's wistful as-
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sertion, presenting evidence supporting the challenged
conclusion does not satisfy the marshaling requirement.
Parties cannot discharge their duty by "simply
providing] an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial." Chen, 2004 UT82, P 77, 100 P3d 1177.
Rather, [HN5] parties are required to
"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's
position"; [they] must play the "devil's
advocate." In so doing, appellants must
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to
construe the evidence in a light favorable
to their case . . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party
must demonstrate how the court found the
facts from the evidence and then explain
why those findings contradict the clear
weight of the evidence.

[***17] Id. P 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT
108, P 19, 57 P.3d 1093) (citations omitted). What Mayflower has done instead is "merely re-argue the factual
case . . . presented in the trial court," id. P 77, leaving
United Park and this court to bear the expense and time
of performing the critical task of marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable. See
id
[*P27] [HN6] We repeatedly have warned of the
grim consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill
the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to perform
this critical task, we can rely on that failure to affirm the
lower court's findings of fact. Id. P 80] see also Clark,
2005 UT 75, P 17, 124 P3d 235. We therefore affirm the
trial court's factual findings, including its determination
that United Park did not intend to waive its right to partition. Because we accept that finding of fact, we must
also affirm the trial court's conclusion that United Park
did not waive its right to partition.
II. OWELTY
[*P28] Because this court has rarely reviewed owelty awards, we understand both parties' confusion as to
the applicable standard of review. We therefore pause to
clarify [***18] the correct standard. [HN7] The owelty
remedy, though enabled by statute, Utah Code Ann. §
7839-41 (2002), is an equitable form of relief. The statute itself recognizes the equitable nature of owelty: it
empowers courts "to make compensator}' adjustment
among the parties according to the principles of equity''
Id. (emphasis added). This is consistent with our characterization of partition, which we have held to be "an eq-

uitable action," in part because "[t]he fundamental objective in a partition action is to divide the property so as
to be fair and equitable and confer no unfair advantage
on any of the co-tenants." Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694
P.2d595, 596 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). We therefore review awards of owelty as we do other forms of
equitable relief
[*P29] [HN8] In equity cases, we review the trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness. RHN Corp. v.
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, P 35, 96 P.3d 935. We grant considerable deference to the trial court's factual findings
and will not reverse those findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id.
[*P30] [HN9] The equitable distribution of property, however, involves more than factual findings and
legal conclusions: [***19] it requires trial courts to
"balance[] the relative significance of the facts and applicable law in order to achieve a fair and equitable result.
This balancing requires the exercise of discretion." Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, P 23, 112 P.3d 495. In
partition actions, trial courts are specifically "accorded
broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate decree."
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1982). We
will affirm a trial court's exercise of that broad discretion
unless it was abused. Id.
[*P31] [HN10] Owelty is a remedy sometimes
awarded in conjunction with a partition order. When a
partition cannot be made without "great prejudice" to a
cotenant, the trial court, by statute, is permitted to order a
sale of the property. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-1 (2002).
Owelty is an equitable alternative to this often undesirable result. Under Utah Code section 78-39-41,
[**1208] a court can go forward with the partition and
award owelty to a prejudiced party in order to compensate for any inequality suffered by that party. In the past,
this court has expressed a preference that trial courts
award owelty rather than forcing a sale. See [***20]
Clawson v. Silver, 2001 UT 42, PP 11, 12, 26 P3d 209.
We reemphasize this preference: "a public sale should be
a last resort," especially in cases where "both [parties]
desire to retain an interest" in the property to be partitioned. Id P 12.
[*P32] Mayflower does not contest the trial court's
actual physical division of the Partition Property. Rather,
it challenges the owelty award, contending that the 4
Conditional Lots awarded by the trial court do not sufficiently compensate it for the prejudicial impact of the
partition. Because Mayflower has failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the owelty award, however, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
[*P33] The trial court undertook an intensive factual inquiry in determining the owelty award. [HN11]
Pursuant to section 78-39-41, the trial court was required
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to determine whether the partition could be made
"equally among the parties . . . without prejudice to the
rights and interests of Mayflower. This was clearly a
question of fact See [***21] Clawson, 2001 UT 42, P
JO, 26 P.3d 209 ("Whether . . . a partition can be made
without great prejudice to the owners is a question of
fact." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[*P34] The partition order entered by the trial court
included the award of owelty in the form of the 4 Conditional Lots that had been recommended by the Majority
Report, thus reflecting the trial court's conclusion that an
equal partition could not be achieved absent an award of
some additional compensation to Mayflower. In reaching
this conclusion, the trial court reviewed the voluminous
record, which includes witness testimony, transcripts of
city meetings, and the Majority and Minority Reports,
and concluded that Mayflower had failed to "present any
evidence that the physical division of the Partition Property recommended by the [majority] referees is not fair
or equitable." The trial court then had to "adjudge compensation" that would remedy any "inequality" resulting
from the partition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41. This task
again required that the trial court survey the record and
consider issues of fact.
[*P35] First, the trial court had to determine the
extent of the inequality to be [***22] remedied by the
owelty award. The court specifically focused on whether
any density had been transferred from the Partition Property or the Mayflower Property to Mountain Village or
the Northside Neighborhood. While the trial court apparently agreed with the Majority Report's conclusion that
some density was "probably" transferred "from the [Partition Property and the Mayflower Property] and clustered into the Northside Neighborhood," it otherwise
found that "no evidence was produced as a basis for
[Mayflower's] claims for relief." Thus, like the drafters
of the Majority Report, it was "convinced that the density
in the Flagstaff Development gained from the [Partition
Property] and from [the Mayflower Property] [was] limited to Mayflower's fair portion of the [Conditional Lots]
in the Northside Neighborhood."
[*P36] In addition to considering evidence concerning the alleged density transfers, the trial court had
to consider the amount of compensation necessary to
achieve a fair and equitable partition. This again required
that the trial court consider the evidence presented, including the recommendations and calculations in the
Majority and Minority Reports. The trial [***23] court
ultimately decided that it would be appropriate to award
Mayflower 4 of the Conditional Lots in order to offset
the inequality produced by the probable transfer of density to the Northside Neighborhood.

[*P37] This examination of the issues of prejudice,
inequality, and compensation undergirded the trial court's
eventual exercise of its discretionary powers in fashioning the owelty award. [HN12] When parties appeal a
court's fact-sensitive use of its discretionary powers, they
"must successfully challenge the factual findings upon
which the trial court's decision . . . depended." Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, nA4, 100 P.3d 1177. This requires
that parties marshal [**1209] the evidence. As we have
previously explained, parties who ask this court to consider fact-sensitive questions—including those questions
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard—have a
duty to marshal all the evidence that formed the basis for
the trial court's ruling. See id. (holding that parties had a
duty to marshal the evidence when challenging the appointment of an interim CEO. a question reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard).
[*P38] We reaffirm the deliberate, clear instruction
found [***24] in our prior decisions regarding the marshaling obligation and emphasize that the labels given
particular issues by courts or counsel are not determinative. Rather, the critical element triggering the duty to
marshal is factual inquiry. Parties seeking appellate review must marshal the evidence on those questions that
require substantive factual inquiry, regardless of whether
those questions are reviewed for clear error or abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, this court will not question a lower
court's factual analysis and will instead assume that the
evidence supports the challenged findings.
[*P39] In challenging the owelty award, Mayflower had a duty to marshal all of the evidence supporting the award, including evidence relevant to the
questions of inequality and appropriate compensation.
Even if the challenged ruling did not specifically reference all such evidence, Mayflower was nevertheless required to present "every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [it]
resists." Id. P 77. This enables the reviewing court to
evaluate fact-centric arguments in the context of the entire body of evidence.
[***25] [*P40] Mayflower has shirked that responsibility here. It has neither corralled the evidence
supporting the compensation calculation of the trial court
nor reviewed the evidence relating to the alleged density
transfers "in a light most favorable to the trial court." Id.
P 78. Instead, Mayflower has cobbled together disjointed
arguments and repeatedly highlighted and restated only
that evidence favorable to its position.
[*P41] Because Mayflower has not properly challenged the factual basis underlying the owelty award, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
We therefore affirm the trial court's award of owelty.
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III. ACCOUNTING
[*P42] Finally, Mayflower argues that the trial
court erred by not requiring United Park to account for
profits it received as a result of the annexation. We decline to analyze this claim on the ground that it is duplicative of Mayflower's claim for owelty. Indeed, the accounting claim hinges on the same familiar question of
fact: whether the alleged transfers of density actually
occurred. And the amount awarded under either remedy
would be shaped by the same consideration: the benefits
or profits received by United [***26] Park as a result of
the alleged density transfers.
[*P43] Furthermore, because the resolution of
Mayflower's request for an accounting hinges on a question of fact, Mayflower has a corresponding duty to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings on
that question As explained above, Mayflower has failed
to do so and therefore has not effectively demonstrated
that the trial court erred in failing to order an accounting.
CONCLUSION
[*P44] Unless appellants marshal the evidence
relevant to fact-dependent questions, they risk having
their appeals rejected without consideration of those
questions. Despite this frequently repeated counsel, parties sometimes attempt a second bite at the factual apple

without first fulfilling this well-established duty. This
tactic may be particularly appealing when a party attempts, as Mayflower has done here, to characterize the
issues as issues of law that are not reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. The duty is not, however,
contingent on labels and standards of review; it instead
springs when an evaluation of the record is central to the
task confronting the reviewing court.
[*P45] While this duty may seem [***27] to place
appellants in the disadvantageous position of advocating
the arguments they seek to rebut, it may often have the
unexpected benefit of bolstering the cogency of the arguments they [**1210] actually advance. Additionally,
and more importantly, fairness and judicial economy
compel us to vigorously enforce the threshold marshaling
requirement found in rule 24(a)(9). Because Mayflower
has not met this threshold, we must assume that the evidence supports the factual findings underlying the trial
court's decision and therefore affirm.
[*P46] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant and Judge Quinn concur in
Justice Parrish's opinion.
[*P47] Having disqualified himself, Justice Nehring does not participate herein; District Court Judge
Anthony B. Quinn sat.

Page 1

LEXSEE104P.3D1220

©
Cited
As of: Oct 01, 2008
In the Matter of the Discipline of Ray Harding, Jr., # 1363.
No. 20020535
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2004 UT100; 104 PJd 1220; 514 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; 2004 Utah LEXIS 221
November 30, 2004, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Publication February 04, 2005.
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION:

[***!] Released for

allow the cross-examination of witnesses. Finally, the
court determined that disbarment was appropriate for the
judge's violation of Utah R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d).

Office of Professional Conduct.

Attorney disbarred.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Utah Office of Professional Conduct recommended the disbarment of respondent judge after a screening panel recommended
suspension and probation. The case was before the court
for review of the recommendations.
OVERVIEW: Police were called to the judge's residence for domestic violence. The judge was found to be
under the influence of drugs at the time. The judge denied the drug charges and maligned his wife in the media
based on her statements against him. He continued to
draw his salary until he finally resigned in the face of
imminent impeachment. After the resignation was accepted, the matter was referred to a screening panel for
consideration of any additional sanctions. The Office
entered recommendations in the case, and the court reviewed the matter. In entering an order of disbarment,
the court determined that it had plenary authority to discipline lawyers for their behavior as judges under Utah
Const art VIII, § 4. The court was permitted to review
the case, even after it permanently disqualified the judge
from the bench, because there was no prior final order
under Utah. R. Law. Disc. & Disability 6(c). Further,
double jeopardy was not implicated. The judge's due
process rights were not violated based on the failure to

OUTCOME: The court entered an order disbarring the
judge.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > General Overview
Governments > Courts > Judges
Legal Ethics > Judicial Conduct
[HN1] In Utah, the responsibility of ensuring that only
those capable of meeting a high standard reach, and stay
on, the bench is shared. The governor appoints judges
based upon the recommendation of a nonpartisan merit
selection commission. The senate reviews these appointments and must confirm them before any judge
takes the bench. Once state judges are appointed and
confirmed, the voters periodically review their performance, retaining those who have demonstrated adequate
performance and removing those who have not. In addition to retention elections, two other mechanisms are
available to safeguard against judicial misbehavior. First,
pursuant to the Utah Constitution, the legislature has the
authority to seek removal by impeachment of any judge
who commits high crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office. Utah Const art VI, §§ 17-19. Second,
for those and other violations of the law or of the Utah
Code of Judicial Conduct, the state constitution empowers the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission to investigate
and recommend to the supreme court the discipline of
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sitting judges. Utah Const, art VIII, § 13. Upon that recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court has the authority
to discipline a state judge or justice, as warranted. Finally, as a voluntary matter, a judge or justice may
choose to retire or resign to avoid the likelihood of other
sanctions under some circumstances.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De
Novo Review
Legal Ethics > Judicial Conduct
[HN2] Under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4. the Utah Supreme Court has plenary authority to discipline lawyers
for their behavior as judges.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Jurisdiction >
State Court Review
Legal Ethics > Judicial Conduct
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > General Overview
[HN3] See Utah R. Law. Disc. & Disability 6(c).

Civil Procedure > Sanctions > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Judicial Conduct
[HN4] In determining an appropriate sanction for judicial
misconduct, the Utah Supreme Court is free to examine
all relevant facts and circumstances and is under no obligation to defer to the conclusions of any other body.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Procedural Due Process > Double Jeopardy
Criminal Law & Procedure > Double Jeopardy > Double Jeopardy Protection > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Judicial Conduct
[HN5] There is no basis for a claim of double jeopardy
protection in either judicial discipline or lawyer discipline matters. Both are matters of appointment, oath, and
privilege. Neither is a matter of criminal sanction, of
being twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same
offense. U.S. Const, amend. V. Double jeopardy protects
against successive prosecutions for the same criminal
offense, after acquittal, and not against successive judicial and lawyer discipline proceedings arising from the
same misconduct by a sitting judge.

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Jurisdictional Sources
> General Overview
Civil Procedure > Counsel > General Overview
Legal Ethics > General Overview
[HN6] Attorney discipline matters are civil in nature.
Moreover, attorney discipline proceedings, being the

exclusive province of the Utah Supreme Court, are conducted under the rules and directions it gives. Usually, if
the Utah Ethics and Disciplinary Committee determines
that a serious violation of the canons of lawyer behavior
has occurred, the matter is directed to the district court
for a hearing on that evidence. The district court, in lawyer discipline matters, has only the jurisdiction or
authority the Utah Supreme Court delegates to it, and the
decision of the district court, acting under a direct delegation of our exclusive authority, is subject to review
only by the Utah Supreme Court.

Administrative Law > Agency Adjudication > Hearings
> General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Examination of
Witnesses > General Overview
Legal Ethics > General Overview
[HN7] The Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, under which the proceedings were conducted, do
not provide to the attorney who is the subject of the
hearing the right to cross-examine witnesses. In fact, all
questioning is usually done by the screening panel, and
includes opportunity for the lawyer, his legal counsel,
and the complaining party, to suggest areas of inquiry to
the panel. The accused lawyer is given prior notice of the
charges, notice of the hearing, a right to be present at the
hearing, and to be represented by counsel at the hearing.
The lawyer is guaranteed a right to appear and present
testimony, offer witnesses on his own behalf, and present
an oral argument with respect to the complaint against
him. The proceedings are recorded and preserved for
review as necessary, and a written report of the panel's
findings and conclusions is given to the lawyer. Utah R.
Law. Disc. & Disability 10. These measures are adequate, given the nature of lawyer discipline proceedings,
to ensure due process to a lawyer accused of misconduct.
Direct and cross-examination of the witnesses is not required in the quasi-administrative setting of the screening
panel.

Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments
[HN8] Although they are extremely useful guidelines
and will be accorded deference in the vast majority of
cases, the Utah Supreme Court is not restricted by the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct in evaluating
whether an attorney should be disbarred. Rather, it examines all relevant facts and circumstances in attempting
to determine what punishment, if any, is appropriate to
deter similar conduct and to protect the public.

Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Illegal Conduct
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[HN9] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. Indeed, a lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an
inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney.
COUNSEL: Billy L. Walker, Salt Lake City, for the
Utah State Bar.
Gregory G. Skordas, Jack M. Morgan, Jr., Salt Lake
City, for Ray Harding, Jr.
Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah Lawyers Helping Lawyers.
JUDGES: WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice. Chief
Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and
Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion.
OPINION BY: WILKIMS
OPINION
[**1221] WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
[*P1] In the American system of justice, the fairness, impartiality, stability, and wisdom of our legal
system depend in major part on the integrity of the men
and women serving as judges. We expect those to whom
we entrust our lives, fortunes, and honor to exemplify
those virtues. Respect for the rule of law is necessary for
a democracy to function and to flourish. As a consequence, respect for the rule of law by those we select as
judges is mandatory.
[*P2] [HN1] In Utah, the responsibility of ensuring
that only those capable of meeting this high standard
reach, and stay on, the bench is shared. The governor
appoints judges [***2] based upon the recommendation
of a nonpartisan merit selection commission. The senate
reviews these appointments and must confirm them before any judge takes the bench. Once state judges are
appointed and confirmed, the voters periodically review
their performance, ] retaining those who have demonstrated adequate performance and, on rare occasions,
removing those who have not.
1
Retention elections for state judges occur
during regular general elections on six-year cycles for district, juvenile, and court of appeals
judges, Utah Code Ann. § 20A~12-201(l)(b)(ii)
(2003), and ten-year cycles for justices of the supreme court, id §20A-12-201(l)(b)(i).
[*P3] In addition to retention elections, two other
mechanisms are available to safeguard [**1222] against
judicial misbehavior. First, pursuant to the Utah Consti-

tution, the legislature has the authority to seek removal
by impeachment of any judge who commits "high
crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office." Utah
Const art [***3] VI, §§ 17-19. Second, for those and
other violations of the law or of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the state constitution empowers the Judicial
Conduct Commission to investigate and recommend to
the supreme court the discipline of sitting judges. Utah
Const, art. VIII, § 13. Upon that recommendation, the
supreme court has the authority to discipline a state judge
or justice, as warranted.
[*P4] Finally, as a voluntary matter, a judge or justice may choose to retire or resign to avoid the likelihood
of other sanctions under some circumstances.
[*P5] The judge in this case, Ray Harding, Jr.,
chose the latter option. He resigned from his seat on the
Fourth District Court while an impeachment resolution
was pending in the legislature and a recommendation
from the Judicial Conduct Commission to remove him
from office was in transit to the supreme court.
[*P6] We accepted the resignation of former judge
Harding, barred him from judicial office, and referred to
the Utah State Bar the question of what additional action
was appropriate under these circumstances. We directed
the Bar to inquire into the facts of Harding's situation and
to make a recommendation to us as to [***4] what, if
any, action was necessary with respect to his continuing
privilege to practice law in Utah. The Bar investigated
and submitted its recommendations. It presented the results of its investigation to a screening panel of the Ethics and Disciplinary Committee, which is appointed by
this court and part of the apparatus of lawyer discipline
we have established. The screening panel recommended
suspension and probation. However, the Office of Professional Conduct recommended that we consider disbarment of former Judge Ray Harding, Jr., for acts committed while sitting as a district court judge that violated
the Rules of Professional Conduct. We agree that disbarment is warranted in this case.
FACTS
[*P7] On July 13, 2002, police responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Judge Ray Harding, Jr. There, the officers discovered cocaine, heroin,
and drug paraphernalia. In addition, Harding tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and Valium. His wife informed
the police that she had observed Harding smoking crack
cocaine on a prior occasion and that Harding previously
told her that he had been using crack and heroin since
October 2001, while serving as a district [***5] court
judge. Harding was arrested and charged with two counts
of unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony. Subsequently, he pled guilty to two
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counts of attempted possession or use of a controlled
substance-a class A misdemeanor-and was sentenced to
two one-year jail terms (with 120 days of actual incarceration), fined $ 9250. ordered to perform 500 hours of
community service, and placed on two years' probation,
which included participation in individual therapy and
recovery programs.
[*P8] At the time charges were filed, Harding was
actively serving as a judge in the Fourth District Court.
He has been a member of the Bar since 1978 and was
appointed to the bench in September 1995. Beginning on
July 14, 2002, the day after his arrest, various news media accounts informed the public of Harding's drug use,
including the allegation that he had presided over court
proceedings while under the influence of controlled substances. In response, Harding steadfastly maintained his
innocence and maligned his wife in the media by branding her a liar and a bad influence on their children.
[*P9] On November 19, 2002, the Judicial Conduct
Commission [***6]
instituted formal proceedings
against Harding, who, although suspended from his duties and periodically incarcerated or in drug rehabilitation
treatment, was still drawing his full judicial salary. Following a full disciplinary hearing [**1223] process, the
Commission issued an order recommending removal in
mid-February, 2003, which it then forwarded to us for
our review and action. At approximately the same time,
the Utah House of Representatives, in response to the
public outcry over Harding's criminal conduct and continued status as a sitting district court judge, passed a
resolution to impeach him, the first such resolution in
Utah history. However, before the senate could vote on
the resolution and before this court had received the
Commission's recommendation, Harding resigned from
the bench effective February 28, 2003. It was approximately one week later that Harding pled guilty to two
counts of attempted possession or use of a controlled
substance.
[*P10] In an order dated March 25, 2003, this court
acknowledged receipt of the Commission's recommendation but noted that Harding's resignation had rendered
the issue of removal moot. Nevertheless, we ordered that
Harding "be permanently [***7] disqualified from
serving in any judicial or quasi-judicial position in the
State of Utah" and, in a separate document, referred the
question of Harding's fitness to practice law to the Office
of Professional Conduct, instructing it to "proceed with a
disciplinary review under its ordinary rules, but with its
conclusions and recommendations regarding [Harding's]
license . . . to be submitted directly to this Court for final
action."
[*P11] Pursuant to our directive, the Office of Professional Conduct conducted an investigation and pre-

sented its findings and recommendation at a formal
hearing before a screening panel in January 2004. Harding, accompanied by counsel, appeared at the hearing,
offered his own testimony and that of several witnesses,
and presented arguments concerning the Office of Professional Conduct's proposed sanction. The screening
panel considered the matter as it would for any lawyer
caught in the snare of drugs. It noted Harding's efforts at
rehabilitation and recommended a six-month suspension
from the practice of law as the appropriate sanction. The
panel further recommended that the suspension be stayed
and that Harding be placed on probation for five [***8]
years, provided he submit to random drug testing and
continued to participate in a substance abuse rehabilitation program. The Office of Professional Conduct, to
whom our instructions were directed, however, takes the
position that Harding should be either suspended for two
or three years or disbarred, based upon our constitutional
authority to control the practice of law, and our prior
actions suggesting that either the longer suspension or
disbarment is the appropriate sanction in a case such as
this. These recommendations now come before us for
final disposition. Unlike other matters often handled
here, lawyer discipline and judicial discipline come to us
as matters of original jurisdiction, as opposed to being
presented as an appeal. We review the recommendations
in that light.
ANALYSIS
[*P12] [HN2] Under article eight, section four of
the Utah Constitution, this court has plenary authority to
discipline lawyers for their behavior as judges. See Utah
Const, art VIII, § 4 ("The Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law, including . . . the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law."). In addition, Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline [***9]
and Disability provides that "[a] [HN3] former judge
who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as
a lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the
lawyer was a judge." Utah R. Lawyer Discipline & Disability 6(c). [HN4] In determining an appropriate sanction, this court is free to examine all relevant facts and
circumstances and is under no obligation to defer to the
conclusions of any other body. See In re Anderson, 2004
UT 7, PP46-47, 82 P3d 1134.
[*P13] As an initial matter, Harding argues that we
lack jurisdiction over this proceeding. He contends,
rather, that our "final order" of March 25, 2003, represents a [**1224] final determination under Rule 6(c) of
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and that
this court is therefore barred from imposing any penalty
other than the already-mandated disqualification of
Harding from future judicial office. In short, the crux of
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Harding's argument is that our review of his fitness to
practice law after we have permanently disqualified him
from the bench subjects him to a form of double jeopardy. We disagree.

factual determination undertaken by the Bar at our direction. Harding asserts that he did not receive a full and
fair hearing before the screening panel because he did
not have the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. He also argues that after the screening panel determined there was probable cause that he violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Office of Professional
Conduct should have filed an action in district court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, as opposed to a proceeding in this court. We
disagree with both arguments.

[*P14] Our disagreement is based on [***10] several grounds. First, the source of our jurisdiction-article
eight, section four of the Utah Constitution-gives us
plenary authority to discipline lawyers for their behavior
as judges. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4. Additionally,
Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability provides that this court may sanction lawyers for misconduct committed while on the bench, except in cases
where "the misconduct was . . . the subject of a judicial
disciplinary proceeding as to which there has been a final
determination by the Supreme Court." Utah R. Lawyer
Discipline & Disability 6(c). Harding fails to note that no
disciplinary proceeding reached us for which any final
order could have then issued. Our action in March 2003
was prompted by his resignation, which included the
pledge not to seek judicial office again. We simply took
him at his word. The disciplinary proceedings, having
stretched through a number of months in the Judicial
Conduct Commission, were rendered moot, and never
reached us for action, as a result of Harding's resignation.

[*P18] Harding repeatedly relies upon an analogy
to criminal process in making his arguments. However,
as we have said before, [HN6] attorney discipline matters
are civil in nature. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d207, 214 (Utah
1997). Moreover, attorney discipline proceedings, being
the exclusive province of this court, are conducted under
the rules and directions we give. The Ethics and Disciplinary Committee screening panel [***13] handled the
factual investigation of Harding's misconduct. They did
so because we directed the [**1225] Bar, through its
Office of Professional Conduct, to follow its usual procedure in conducting the factual investigation up to a
point.

[*P15] Moreover, on the same day we accepted
and memorialized Harding's resignation and pledge not
to seek judicial office [***11] in the future, we also issued an order to the Office of Professional Conduct, directing it to proceed with a disciplinary review "under its
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. Harding's license to practice law to
be submitted directly to this Court for final action."
Taken together, these simultaneous orders demonstrate
that our disqualification of Harding from judicial office
was not a "final determination" under Rule 6(c). Instead,
these documents gave notice of our ongoing jurisdiction
over the review of Harding's fitness to practice law
within this state. Our jurisdiction over this matter is certain.

[*P19] Usually, if our Ethics and Disciplinary
Committee determines that a serious violation of the
canons of lawyer behavior has occurred, the matter is
directed to the district court for a hearing on that evidence. The district court, in lawyer discipline matters,
has only the jurisdiction or authority we delegate to it,
and the decision of the district court, acting under a direct delegation of our exclusive authority, is subject to
review only by us. In Harding's case, knowing that we
neither needed nor desired the participation of the district
court, we directed the Bar to return the matter directly to
us for resolution. Our primary purpose was to develop a
factual record that included Harding's claims and defenses, as well as the matters establishing the nature and
extent of his misbehavior while a judge.

[*P16] Regarding Harding's double jeopardy claim,
we need only note that [HN5] there is no basis for a
claim of double jeopardy protection in either judicial
discipline or lawyer discipline matters. Both are matters
of appointment, oath, and privilege. Neither is a matter
of criminal sanction, of being "twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb" for the same offense. U.S. Const, amend V.
Double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions
for the same criminal offense, after acquittal, and not
against successive judicial and lawyer discipline [***12]
proceedings arising from the same misconduct by a sitting judge.

[*P20] [HN7] The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, under which the proceedings were conducted,
do not provide to the attorney who is [*** 14] the subject
of the hearing the right to cross-examine witnesses. In
fact, all questioning is usually done by the screening
panel, and includes opportunity for the lawyer, his legal
counsel, and the complaining party, to suggest areas of
inquiry to the panel. The accused lawyer is given prior
notice of the charges, notice of the hearing, a right to be
present at the hearing, and to be represented by counsel
at the hearing. The lawyer is guaranteed a right to appear
and present testimony, offer witnesses on his own behalf,
and present an oral argument with respect to the complaint against him. The proceedings are recorded and
preserved for review as necessary, and a written report of

[*P17] Finally, we reject Harding's claim that his
due process rights were denied him in the process of
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he panel's findings and conclusions is given to the lawyer. Utah R. Lawyer Discipline & Disability 10.
[*P21] These measures are adequate, given the
lature of lawyer discipline proceedings, to ensure due
process to a lawyer accused of misconduct. Direct and
cross-examination of the witnesses is not required in the
quasi-administrative setting of the screening panel. As a
result, we find no due process deficiencies in Harding's
case.
[*P22] Turning to the question of the appropriate
punishment [***15] for Harding's misconduct, we hold
that disbarment is necessary. As a preliminary matter, we
emphasize that, [HN8] although they are extremely usefill guidelines and will be accorded deference in the vast
majority of cases, this court is not restricted by the Rules
of Professional Conduct in evaluating whether an attorney should be disbarred. Rather, we examine all relevant
facts and circumstances in attempting to determine what
punishment, if any, is appropriate to deter similar conduct and to protect the public. In this case, we also consider what action is necessary to restore any measure of
lost public confidence in the system of justice caused by
Harding's conduct. Here, there can be no question that
Harding's behavior represented "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice," 2 which was made
all the more egregious because Harding occupied a position on the district court bench. Upon accepting his appointment, Harding took a solemn oath to conduct himself in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct, in furtherance of the public trust placed
in him by the citizens of this state to properly administer
justice. Rather than honoring this trust, however,
[*** 16] Harding's subsequent behavior undermined it.
2 Utah R. Professional Conduct 8.4(d).
[*P23] Standing alone, Harding's possession and
use of unlawful controlled substances might not be
enough to warrant disbarment. However, the totality of
the circumstances indicates that such a penalty is indeed
warranted here. To begin, after being charged, Harding
continued to publicly maintain his innocence and malign
his accusers for over a year. These protestations were
widely reported in the media and disseminated to the
genera] public. He did so with full knowledge of his cul-

pability, as evidenced by his subsequent admission of
[**I226] guilt. While we acknowledge Harding's right
to remain silent and to vigorously defend himself against
the criminal charges pending against him, his aggressive
public statements themselves exacerbated the damage his
conduct caused.1
3 We also note that the comment to rule 8.4(d)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that
[HN9] "lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other
citizens." Utah R. Professional Conduct 8.4(d)
cmt. Indeed, "[a] lawyer's abuse of public office
can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional
role of attorney." Id Here, Harding's behavior
demonstrates an inability to fulfill that role with
the degree of fitness required to practice in this
state.
[***17] [*P24] Furthermore, despite being unable
to hear cases due to the pending criminal charges, Harding continued to draw his full salary and otherwise enjoyed the emoluments of judicial office. Not only did
such behavior bring disrepute upon the legal profession
and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, it
placed an undue burden upon his colleagues on the
Fourth District Court and adversely affected those citizens served by that court. Compounding these abuses,
Harding delayed his decision to resign until the last possible moment, and only did so under intense media coverage of the looming dual threat of impeachment by the
legislature and removal by this court. In sum, all of these
acts, taken together, constitute conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice and, given the circumstances
surrounding their commission, merit disbarment in this
case.
CONCLUSION
[*P25] In light of the nature and circumstances surrounding his misconduct, Ray Harding, Jr., is unfit to
practice law in this state and is disbarred.
[*P26] Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Associate
Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion.

